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After ten years of continuing  immersion  in the whole  productivity  analysis and 
debate, what comes through  loud and clear is that there are some things that 
are common  to all circumstances  of high levels of performance....  These  are 
matters  of the heart  and mind  and not of hardware  and capital.-Hallett' 
MOST  ECONOMISTS  agree that the  slowdown  in aggregate productivity 
growth  in the United  States since the mid-1960s  has played  a pivotal  role 
in the poor performance  of the U.S.  economy. And yet,  "despite 
numerous  studies  of the slowdown,"  BPEA  editors  William  C. Brainard 
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Economy through New Enterprise Development  (Washington, D.C.: The Corporation for 
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and George L. Perry conclude, "its causes have remained  largely a 
mystery. '2 
We think that this mystery stems more from the limitations of 
conventional  economic  analysis  than  from  the impenetrability  of slower 
productivity  growth.  Prevailing  economic  analysis  typically  neglects  the 
human  dimensions  of production  and the institutional  contexts within 
which  economic  actors operate.  We develop in this paper  an alternative 
account of the productivity slowdown that addresses these various 
lacunae. 
We argue in particular  that declining work intensity and lagging 
business innovation since the 1960s-factors  that have been almost 
entirely  elided in recent analyses-provide crucial  missing  clues to the 
productivity  mystery. To develop this argument  we present  and econo- 
metrically  test a "social" model of aggregate  productivity  growth. It 
integrates  technical  and  social  dimensions  of production  and  builds  upon 
an  analysis  of the social setting  that  has conditioned  productivity  growth 
in the United States in the postwar  period.3  It can account empirically 
for almost all the productivity  slowdown. Our  analysis  is provisional;  it 
raises many  issues for further  research,  but  we believe that  it provides  a 
promising  foundation  for resolving the puzzle of slower productivity 
growth  in the U.S. economy. 
We present an alternative  account of the productivity  slowdown in 
five parts. Some simple "stylized facts" related  to work intensity and 
business innovation are first summarized.  We then outline the basic 
elements of a social model  of aggregate  productivity  growth.  A detailed 
econometric  test of that  model  is next  presented,  providing  a comparison 
of its explanatory  power  with  that  of more  conventional  approaches.  We 
then  evaluate  several  possible  additional  or  alternative  hypotheses  about 
the productivity  slowdown, showing  that the basic results of the paper 
are robust even when confronted with competing or supplementary 
interpretations.  The  paper  concludes  with  a brief  discussion  of the policy 
implications  that  might  be drawn  from  our  explanation  of the  productivity 
puzzle. 
2. William  C. Brainard  and  George  L. Perry,  BPEA,  1:1981,  p. vii. 
3. This paper draws heavily on the historical  and structural  analysis developed in 
Samuel  Bowles, David  M. Gordon,  and  Thomas  E. Weisskopf,  Beyond  the Waste  Land: 
A Democratic  Alternative  to Economic  Decline  (Anchor-Doubleday,  1983), especially 
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Declining Work Intensity and Lagging Business Innovation 
Most  economists  have concentrated  on two principal  explanations  of 
the slowdown in the rate of productivity  growth-the  oil-price shock 
and slower rates of capital  formation.  But these two explanations  have 
two important  flaws:  first, neither  factor took effect until 1973-74, well 
after  the beginning  of the productivity  slowdown  in the mid-1960s;  and 
second, even after 1973, these two factors appear to account for a 
relatively  small  portion  of the retardation  in productivity  growth. 
Journalists,  business observers, and historians  frequently  argue  that 
two other serious problems  began to afflict  the U.S. economy after  the 
mid-1960s:  friction began to mount at the workplace, leading to an 
erosion of worker cooperation and worker effort; and corporations 
turned  increasingly  toward  shorter-term  investment  policies, resulting 
in more  sluggish  business attempts  to improve  productive  efficiency.4 
These trends,  if manifest,  would  obviously  help  explain  the slowdown 
in productivity  growth  since the mid-1960s.  But economists  have tended 
to overlook these developments either because they do not typically 
study  work intensity  and  business innovation  in macroeconomic  analy- 
ses of aggregate  productivity  growth  or because they suspect that such 
qualitative  factors cannot  easily be integrated  into rigorous  quantitative 
investigation.' 
4.  See, among many such recent commentaries,  The Business Week Team, The 
Reindustrialization  of America  (McGraw-Hill,  1982); James O'Toole,  Making America 
Work: Productivity  and  Responsibility  (Continuum,  1981); and  Ira C.  Magaziner and 
Robert B.  Reich,  Minding America's  Business:  The Decline  and Rise  of the American 
Economy  (Harcourt,  Brace,  Jovanovich,  1982). 
5. These qualitative  factors  are  the intangibles  about  which  C. Jackson  Grayson  writes 
in "Emphasizing  Capital  Investment  Is a Mistake,"  Wall  Street  Jolurnal, October  11, 1982: 
Concentration  on capital investment  has led to the relative neglect of "other factors' 
important  for growth-management,  quality,  technology,  knowledge,  employee  involve- 
ment,  training  and  labor-management  cooperation. 
Why?  For one thing,  these other  factors  are mostly  intangibles.  Econometric  models 
need  numbers,  and  intangibles  are  difficult  to measure  and  quantify.  Also, . . . [it]  is much 
more comfortable  to work with things you can see, touch and kick. For both reasons, 
these intangibles  are most often omitted  from  models, policies  and  managerial  decisions, 
even though  collectively  they have a larger  impact.  As these other  factors  have increased 
in importance,  their omission partly  explains why our economic policies and forecasts 
have become increasingly  inaccurate,  and why our productivity  slowdown  has been so 
"puzzling"  to many. 384  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
It is impossible, indeed, to measure  directly or exactly either work 
intensity or innovative activity; one can neither attach ergometers  to 
workers in the shop and office nor track the frequency of creative 
breakthroughs  in corporate  boardrooms  and research  laboratories.  But 
we think there is sufficiently  compelling  indirect  evidence of declining 
work intensity and lagging  business innovation  in the U.S.  economy 
since the mid-1960s  to warrant  careful and systematic integration  of 
these factors into analyses of the productivity  slowdown in the United 
States.6 
WORKPLACE  FRICTION 
From World War II through the early 1960s labor-management 
relations  appear  to have become increasingly  peaceful  and cooperative. 
By 1947,  90 percent  of union  contracts  already  pledged  no strikes  during 
the term of contract. Strike activity itself declined substantially;  the 
proportion  of work  time idled because of strikes  fell, for example, from 
an average  of 0.54 percent  in the first  postwar  business cycle, 1946-48, 
to 0.22 percent  in the next four  cycles, 1948-66. Although  the early  data 
are somewhat fragmentary,  it appears  that the proportion  of workers 
satisfied  with theirjobs also increased  significantly  from  the early 1950s 
through  the mid-1960s.7 
6. In all discussion that follows, we date business cycles by choosing as peaks the 
years  in  which  the  ratio  of actual  to potential  GNP,  as calculated  by  the  Bureau  of Economic 
Analysis and revised by the Council  of Economic  Advisers, reached  its business-cycle 
peak. When  comparing  business-cycle  averages,  we date  the cycles in the text and  tables 
as extending  from one peak to the next even though most of the cycle averages are 
calculated  for the years  extending  from  the year  after  the peak  to the following  peak. 
7. The  union  no-strike  contract  figure  is from  Fred  H. Joiner,  "Developments  in Union 
Agreements,"  in Colston  E. Warne  and  others, eds., Yearbook  of American  Labor, vol. 
2, Labor in Postwar  America  (Remsen  Press, 1949),  p. 35. Strike  frequency  in this and 
subsequent  paragraphs  is from U.S. Department  of Labor, Employment  and Training 
Report of the President, 1981 (Government  Printing  Office, 1981),  table G-8. Data on 
trends  in work  dissatisfaction  summarize  results  of a question  asked  consistently  since  the 
mid-1950s  by the Opinion  Research  Corporation:  "How do you like  yourjob-the  kind  of 
work  you do?" We summed  the percentages  responding  "very much"  or "a good deal." 
Although  the data  are  confidential,  they are  summarized  in Michael  R. Cooper  and  others, 
"Early Warning  Signals: Growing  Discontent among Managers,"  Business, January- 
February  1980. For data on job satisfaction  reported  in subsequent  paragraphs,  dates 
reported  in the text correspond  to the particular  periods  of aggregation  reported  in  this last 
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Real and obvious benefits  to production  workers  during  the postwar 
boom led to this harmony.  Real spendable  hourly  earnings  increased  at 
an  average  annual  rate  of 2.1 percent  from  1948  to 1966;  and  the incidence 
of industrial  accidents-one  obvious  barometer  of working  conditions- 
declined by almost one-third  from its average during  the first cycle of 
the postwar  boom, 1946-48, to its average  during  the last cycle, 1959- 
66.8 
After 1965 this rosy glow began to fade. During  the next business 
cycle from 1966  to 1973,  for example, the average  annual  growth  of real 
spendable  hourly  earnings  fell to 1.0  percent,  and  the average  frequency 
of industrial  accidents increased  by 24 percent over its average  for the 
previous  cycle. 
At the same time, tight labor markets increased workers' relative 
bargaining  power  and  moderated  the risks  of dismissal.  During  the 1966- 
73 cycle, for example, the average  ratio of quits to layoffs in manufac- 
turing  almost doubled its average in the previous cycle, reflecting  the 
greater sense of labor independence that the late-1960s boom had 
engendered.9 
Taking  advantage  of this heightened  relative  independence,  workers 
appear  to have become increasingly  restive  at the workplace  and  in their 
relationships  with employers. The incidence of part-time  absenteeism 
increased  by 32 percent  from 1959-66 to 1966-73. The average  annual 
percentage  of work time lost to strikes increased  by 115 percent from 
1959-66 to 1966-71 before the Nixon wage-price  controls moderated 
the surge  in 1972-73. From 1961-67 to 1967-73, further,  the percent  of 
strikes  because of working  conditions  increased  by more  than  one-third, 
and  the percent  of strikes  taking  place during  the term  of contract,  more 
familiarly  known  as wildcat  strikes, increased  by one-fourth.  '0 
8.  Because of serious  problems  with the traditional  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  series 
on real spendable  weekly earnings,  we developed our own alternative  series on "real 
spendable  hourly  earnings."  See Thomas  E. Weisskopf, "A New Spendable  Earnings 
Series,  " Technical  Note 2 (Economics  Institute  of the  Center  for  Democratic  Alternatives, 
October  1983).  We similarly  resolved  problems  in comparing  accident  rates  from before 
and  after  new reporting  practices  were  instituted  in 1970.  See Michele  I. Naples  and  David 
M. Gordon,  "The  Industrial  Accident  Rate:  Creating  a Consistent  Time  Series,  " Technical 
Note 1  (Economics  Institute  of the Center  for  Democratic  Alternatives,  December  1981). 
9.  Quits and layoffs here and in subsequent  paragraphs  are from Employment  and 
Training Report of the President,  1981, table C-14. 
10. Data on absenteeism,  strikes  to improve  working  conditions,  and wildcat  strikes 
are  from  Michele  I. Naples, "The Structure  of Industrial  Relations,  Labor  Militance,  and 386  Br-ookings Paper-s oni Economic  Activ'ity,  2.1983 
This spreading  worker restiveness does not appear to have been 
limited  to blue-collar  workers  or  workers  in  unions.  Among  all  production 
personnel,  both  blue-collar  and  white-collar  employees,  job satisfaction 
declined between 1965-69 and 1970-74. According to detailed data 
available  from the University  of Michigan's  Quality  of Work  Life Sur- 
veys beginning  in 1969, this declining  job satisfaction  was surprisingly 
widespread;  it  affected  white-collar,  professional,  technical,  and  manage- 
rial  workers  as well as those in blue-collar  occupations.  "  I 
After 1973,  of course, labor  markets  loosened and-by  conventional 
expectations-workers' sense of independence  was bound to decline. 
(The average ratio of quits to layoffs indeed declined, although only 
slightly, from 1966-73 to  1973-79.) But the restiveness apparently 
persisted, despite rising  unemployment,  and in many cases appears  to 
have continued  spreading.  Absenteeism  rates  did  not decline  in 1973-79 
from the average of the previous cycle, while both the percentage of 
strikes over working  conditions and the percentage  of wildcat strikes 
increased. 
Perhaps because workers were still discontented but increasingly 
fearful about either  job quits or protests through  strike activity, they 
appear  to have become increasingly  alienated  on the  job after 1973.  The 
the Rate of Growth  of Productivity:  The Case of U.S. Mining  and Manufacturing,  1953- 
1977" (Ph.D. dissertation,  University of Massachusetts  at Amherst, 1982), tables 24 
and  4. Dates  in the text for 1961-66  are  determined  by 1961  starting  points  on all three  data 
series. 
We concentrate  in the text on aggregate  indicators  of trends  in work  intensity  because 
the  focus in this  paper  is on the slowdown  in  aggregate  productivity  growth.  We recognize, 
nonetheless,  that such aggregative  indicators  are subject  to a wide variety  of distortions 
and  that  disaggregated  industry  studies  are  necessary  to provide  more  substantial  support 
for our hypotheses  about  lagging  work  intensity.  The two most rigorous  industry  studies 
of which  we are aware,  one on coal and  one on automobiles,  provide  strong  support  not 
only for our inferences  about  the timing  and magnitude  of trends  in work intensity  after 
the mid-1960s  but also for our hypotheses  about  the links between these developments 
and the industry-specific  slowdowns in productivity  growth. On the coal industry  see 
M. Connerton,  R. B. Freeman,  and  J. L. Medoff,  "Productivity  and  Industrial  Relations: 
The Case of U.S. Bituminous  Coal" (Harvard  University, Department  of Economics, 
December 1979). On the automobile  industry  see J. R. Norsworth  and C. A. Zabala, 
"Worker  Attitudes  and  the Cost of Production,"  paper  prepared  for the National  Bureau 
of Economic  Research  Workshop  on Investment  and Productivity,  July 1983.  On manu- 
facturing  as a whole see Michele  I. Naples, "The Structure  of Industrial  Relations,  Labor 
Militance,  and  the Rate  of Growth  of Productivity." 
11. See the sequence  of surveys, Quality  of Work  Life (Institute  for Social Research, 
University  of Michigan),  for 1969,  1973,  and 1977. T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  387 
percent  of nonsupervisory  workers  satisfied  with their  jobs, according 
to the longest  continuous  survey  available,  fell from  68 percent  in 1970- 
74 to 59 percent in 1977-79, triple  the rate of decline from 1965-69 to 
1970-74. And the pervasiveness  of job dissatisfaction  became increas- 
ingly  apparent.  Graham  Staines  concluded  from  the detailed  data  avail- 
able in the Michigan  surveys from 1973  to 1977:  "The sky had finally 
fallen.  Workers  in virtually  all occupational  and  demographic  categories 
evidenced  appreciable . . . [and] unmistakable manifestations  of rising 
discontent.  "  12 
How can all this evidence be summarized?  We think  that much of it 
can be illuminated  through  a simple  proposition  that we develop more 
formally  in subsequent sections: the higher is the cost to workers of 
losing their jobs,  the more cooperative they are likely to be at the 
workplace.  The lower  is the cost of losing  theirjobs, in contrast,  the less 
responsive they will be to employer efforts to boost productivity  and 
extract  greater  labor  effort. We present  in figure  1 a summary  measure 
of the "cost of  job loss," defined  as the average  annual  percentage  of an 
employee's living  standard  that  a representative  worker  could expect to 
lose if dismissed (see the text below for further discussion of this 
variable).  Superimposed  on the annual  series are  the period  averages  for 
1948-66, 1966-73, and 1973-79. Disregarding  for the moment  cyclical 
movements, the cost of job loss rose until  the early 1960s  and then fell 
precipitously  until  the early 1970s;  despite much  higher  unemployment 
rates after 1973,  the cost of job loss did not return  to anything  close to 
its levels during  the postwar  boom. 
Based on this schematic and necessarily indirect  evidence, we hy- 
pothesize that workers  became less fearful  of losing their  jobs after  the 
mid-1960s,  that  they became  increasingly  restless at the workplace,  and 
that their labor  effort might  well have declined  as a result. Economists 
may have been slow to recognize these trends, but business observers 
noticed them early. The Wall Street Journal reported in  1970, for 
example: 
Observers  of the labor-management  scene . ..  almost unanimously  assert that 
the  present  situation  is the worst  within  memory.. .  . Morale  in many  operations 
12. Graham  L. Staines,  "Is WorkerDissatisfactionRising?"  Challenge,  vol. 22(May- 
June 1979),  p. 39. See also Graham  L. Staines  and  Robert  P. Quinn,  "American  Workers 
Evaluate  the Quality  of Their  Jobs," Monthlv  Labor  Reiiew, vol. 102  (January  1979),  pp. 
3-12. 388  Br-ookings Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
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Sources:  Text equation 6 and the data cited in the appendix. 
a.  The variable is defined as the average annual percentage of an employee's  living standard that a representative 
employee  could expect  to lose  if that employee  were dismissed  from the job;  the variable, expressed  as a fraction, 
has a potential range from zero to  1.0. The horizontal lines in the figure represent averages  of annual data for 1948- 
66,  1966-73,  and 1973-79,  respectively. 
is sagging  badly, intentional  work slowdowns  are cropping  up more  frequently 
and  absenteeism  is soaring.. .  .  [Many  corporations]  contend  the problem  ... 
is so widespread  it's their  major  headache  at the moment.'3 
MANAGEMENT  TORPOR 
It has become  almost commonplace  among business  observers,  as 
Business  Week puts it, that U.S.  corporations  have  recently  suffered 
"from a refusal to see beyond the next quarterly earnings statement.  " 1  14 
Many  suggest  that corporations  have  been  pursuing productivity-en- 
hancing innovations  less  vigorously,  shifting toward more speculative 
financial investments and shrinking  from the longer-term entrepreneurial 
risks that provide a dynamic impulse in a growing economy. 
13. Quoted  in Jeremy  Brecher,  Strike!  (Straight  Arrow  Books, 1972),  pp. 266-67. 
14.  The Business  Week Team, The Reindustrialization ofAmerica,  p. 48. T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordoni  389 
These alarms  may  be overblown,  but there  may nonetheless  be some 
useful kernels  among  the  journalistic  chaff. We think  it quite likely, on 
the basis of available  and largely indirect quantitative  evidence, that 
U.S. corporations  grew less and less inclined to introduce  productive 
innovations  after  the mid-1960s. 
First, applications  for patents  grew more slowly as the boom turned 
to stagflation.  We can compare  the average annual  rates of growth in 
patent applications  filed for inventions  in successive five-year  periods 
from  the mid-  I  950s: 1956-60 to 1961-65, 2.5 percent; 1961-65 to 1966- 
70, 1.8 percent; 1966-70 to 1971-75, 1.4 percent;  and 1971-75 to 1976- 
80, - 0.1 percent.  15 
Second, by most available  interpretations,  the growth  of private  and 
public  expenditures  on research  and development  decelerated  after  the 
late 1960s. According  to both Kendrick  and Griliches,  for example, it 
seems likely that the growth of R&D expenditures  slowed during  the 
1966-73 business cycle and then slowed further  or perhaps  even stag- 
nated after 1973.16 
Third,  one can observe a trend  after  the 1960s  toward  greater  relative 
use of corporate  funds for increases in financial  assets-rather  than  for 
real investment  and, therefore,  for support  or application  of productive 
innovations.  Increases  in  financial  assets, as a percentage  of all  corporate 
uses of funds, rose from  an annual  average  of 19.8  percent  in 1959-66 to 
25.4 percent  in 1966-73 and  to 25.8 percent  in 1973-79.  '7 
As we argue  in the  following  sections, innovative  pressure  on business 
is best captured,  other things  being equal, by changes in the frequency 
of business failures. Although  these failures are obviously countercy- 
clical, with the deaths  of firms  rising  when utilization  falls in short-term 
contractions,  we think  they are also likely to rise over the longer term 
15. Growth rates calculated  from data in U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States,  1981 (GPO, 1981), table 945. The five-year periods reported 
in the text are  constrained  by the data  reported  in the source. 
16. See, for example,  John  W. Kendrick,  "Survey  of the Factors  Contributing  to the 
Decline  in U.S. Productivity  Growth,"  in Federal  Reserve Bank  of Boston, The  Decline 
of Productivity  Growth,  Conference  Series  22 (FRBB, 1980),  pp. 1-21; and  Zvi Griliches, 
"R&D  and  the Productivity  Slowdown,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 70 (May  1980, 
Papers and Proceedings, 1979), pp. 343-48. See also Kim B. Clark  and Zvi Griliches, 
"Productivity  Growth  and R&D at the Business Level: Results from the PIMS Data 
Base," Working  Paper  916  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  June 1982). 
17. Based on data  on sources  and  uses of corporate  funds  in Economic  Report  of the 
President,  1981  (GPO,  1981),  table  B-87. 390  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
when business innovation  is most intense. Firms  that do not keep pace 
with or can least afford to keep up with modernization  will be more 
vulnerable  to both collapse and bankruptcy  when the rate of business 
innovation is high. Business failures do not cause intensification  of 
innovative  pressure, according  to this argument,  but they are sympto- 
matic  of underlying  increases  in the forces that  spur  innovative  activity; 
in other  words, the direction  of causality  is from  innovative  pressure  to 
business  failures  and  not the reverse. 
This supposition  is reinforced  by the pattern  of business failures in 
the postwar period. Contrary  to many expectations, business failures 
have not risen monotonically  with declining  utilization  rates during  the 
1970s-although they have obviously soared since 1979  as a result of 
higher  real interest rates. They were much lower in the 1970s, indeed, 
than  during  the years  of sustained  prosperity.  We present  a decyclicized 
index of the frequency of business failures in figure  2. We have both 
taken the residuals of a regression of the failure rate on an index of 
capacity utilization and taken a three-year moving average of that 
residual  to highlight  the secular  trends.  The figure  seems consistent  with 
much of the business literature:  forces creating  business failures rose 
steadily through the mid-1960s and then declined steadily until the 
dramatic  shift  in monetary  policy in October  1979  launched  interest  rates 
into orbit.  18 
This measure  of innovative  pressure  on business is indirect,  as is the 
evidence on lagging work intensity. It is nonetheless suggestive and 
more or less consistent with the qualitative  and casual observations  of 
the business community.  We find  it plausible  to hypothesize that U.S. 
corporations  have been less likely to pursue productive innovations 
since  the mid-  1960s  than  they  had  been  before. Such  a flagging  inclination 
toward  productive  innovation  is likely to have contributed  to the pro- 
ductivity slowdown. As the journalist William  Greider  puckishly ob- 
served  in  a recent  article,  "When  the  HarvardBusiness  Review  discovers 
that there is  something wrong in the executive suite, something is 
wrong.  "19 
18. See the appendix  to this paper  for  definitions  and  sources. We  discuss  below some 
of the problems  with using the business-failure  rate for these purposes;  see the section 
below, "A Composite  Social  Model  of Aggregate  Productivity  Growth,"  and  note 51. 
19. William  Greider,  "Taking  Care  of Business," Rolling Stone,  December  9, 1982, 
p. 11. T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gor-don  391 
Figure 2.  Adjusted Measure of Business Failures, 1949-81a 
Cyclically  adjusted  deviations  around  the mean 
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Sources:  Authors'  estimates  based on data from sources  cited in the appendix. 
a.  The  original measure of  the  business  failure rate is expressed  as the frequency  per  10,000 listed  enterprises. 
We then regressed this measure on an index of capacity with annual observations  from 1949 to 1979 (the period over 
which  our subsequent  econometric  work was  carried out).  We next  took  a three-year  (and end-of-period)  moving 
average of  the  residuals  from the regression,  both to  control  for the  short-term business  cycle  and to  smooth  the 
cyclical  fluctuations in the underlying measure.  The values  for  1949, 1950, 1980, and 1981 were based on predicted 
rather than actual observed  residuals from the regression equation. 
Determinants  of Aggregate Productivity  Growth 
Conventional  analyses  of productivity  growth  have relied  on what  we 
call  a technical  model  of production:  given  existing  technical  knowledge, 
labor  and nonlabor  inputs  are routinely  and predictably  translated  into 
output. The prevailing  conclusion derived from this model is that the 
recent  and  persistent  slowdown  in aggregate  productivity  growth  results 
from the fact, in Martin  Neil Baily's words, "either that the rate of 
technological  change  is now much  slower  than  it was, or  that  the effective 392  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
flows of capital and labor services have grown more slowly than the 
measured  quantities  of these inputs,  or perhaps  both."20 
We do not doubt that such "technical" factors affect the level of 
aggregate  productivity.  But we do question  whether  such a mechanical 
model  of input-output  relations  in production  could  possibly capture  the 
more complex social determinants  of aggregate  productivity and its 
growth. We have therefore sought a more complete social model of 
productivity  that  treats  economic  actors  as social beings, as people with 
aspirations  and inhibitions,  with needs and  resentments,  with economi- 
cally  important  and  potentially  measurable  reactions  to their  institutional 
setting and its history. We begin with a separate  analysis of the factors 
affecting  work  intensity  and  business innovation  and then combine  that 
analysis  with  hypotheses  derived  from  the  more  familiar  technical  model. 
WORK  INTENSITY:  THE  MARX  EFFECT 
Marxian  analysis of the labor process has built upon a self-evident 
proposition:  the  intensity  of human  labor  in  production  can  vary  greatly  .  21 
20. Martin  Neil Baily, "Productivity  and  the Services  of Capital  and  Labor,"  BPEA, 
1:1981,  pp. 1-2. We  have  not  provided  a survey  ofthe  mainstream  literature  on  productivity, 
given  its extensive  coverage  in earlier  issues of BPEA,  but  we have  found  especially  useful 
Edward F. Denison,  Accounting for Slower Economic  Growth: The United States  in the 
1970s  (Brookings  Institution,  1979);  J. R. Norsworth,  Michael  J. Harper,  and  Kent  Kunze, 
"The  Slowdown  in Productivity  Growth:  Analysis  of Some  Contributing  Factors"  BPEA, 
2:1979,  pp. 387-421; Kendrick,  "Survey  of the Factors," pp. 1-21; and  Baily, "Produc- 
tivity  and  the Services  of Capital  and  Labor,"  pp. 1-50. 
21. For some of the most important  analytic  contributions  in the recent  literature,  see 
Stephen  A. Marglin,  "What  Do Bosses Do? The Origins  and Functions  of Hierarchy  in 
Capitalist  Production,"  Review  of Radical  Political  Economics,  vol. 6 (Summer  1974),  pp. 
60-112; Herbert  Gintis, "The Nature  of Labor  Exchange  and the Theory  of Capitalist 
Production,"  Review of Radical Political  Economics,  vol.  8 (Summer 1976), pp. 36-54; 
James Devine and Michael  Reich, "The Microeconomics  of Conflict  and Hierarchy  in 
Capitalist Production," Review ofRadical  Political Economics,  vol.  12 (Winter 1981), pp. 
27-45;  and Samuel Bowles, "The Production  Process in a Competitive Economy: 
Walrasian,  Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian  Models" (University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst,  Department  of Economics,  May 1983). 
Some interesting  parallels  exist between  this neo-Marxian  literature  and some recent 
neoclassical  discussions  of hierarchy  and involuntary  unemployment.  See, for example, 
Guillermo  Calvo, "Quasi-Walrasian  Theories  of Unemployment,"  American  Economic 
Review,  vol.  69 (May 1979, Papers  and Proceedings,  1978), pp.  102-07;  and Edward P. 
Lazear, "Agency, Earnings  Profiles,  Productivity,  and Hours Restrictions,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 71 (September  1981),  pp. 606-20. T. Weisskopf,  S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  393 
We refer  to this  potential  variation  in  work  intensity  as the "Marx  effect" 
and rely on some of Marx's  insights  into the structure  and dynamics  of 
production  in capitalist  economies  in the  following  analysis  of this effect. 
Employers  will try, other  things  equal,  to minimize  the cost in wages, 
supervision,  and  other  expenditures  of a unit  of work  done. Their  tasks 
are complicated,  in large  part,  because employees will be likely to value 
positively at least some nonwork  activities  during  work  time-which  by 
definition  will not contribute  to the output  of the firm-and will therefore 
seek to work less intensively  than  their employers  prefer.  This presup- 
position does not imply that work is absolutely unbearable  or that all 
employers  apply  draconian  measures  to exploit  their  workers.  It presup- 
poses, much  more  simply,  that  employees and employers  pursue  objec- 
tives affecting  employee work activity that are not perfectly congruent 
and are hence potentially  in conflict. 
We can therefore  analyze the employers' minimization  problem  by 
focusing on work intensity, denoted as L* and defined as the ratio of 
total effective labor inputs applied in production  to the total hours of 
production-worker  labor power hired by the firm. Because effective 
labor  inputs  are  potentially  variable,  given purchased  labor  hours, work 
intensity  is clearly  variable  as well, suggesting  the crucial  importance  of 
examining  the determinants  of its level and  variation.22 
A critical determinant  of work intensity is the effectiveness of em- 
ployer control over employees. This depends, in turn, on three main 
factors: the expected cost of job loss, the probability  of being detected 
if an employee is performing  at a level of intensity  below management 
expectations. and the probability  of job loss if that poor performance  is 
22. The analysis in the following  discussion  draws primarily  upon Samuel Bowles, 
"Competitive  Wage  Determination  and Involuntary  Unemployment:  A Conflict  Model" 
(University  of Massachusetts  at Amherst,  Department  of Economics, 1981);  David M. 
Gordon,  "Capital-Labor  Conflict  and  the Productivity  Slowdown,"  American  Economic 
Review, vol. 71 (May 1981, Papers and Proceedings,  1980), pp. 30-35;  and Juliet B. Schor 
and Samuel  Bowles, "Conflict  in the Employment  Relation  and the Cost of Job Loss," 
Working  Paper  6 (Economics  Institute  of the Center  for Democratic  Alternatives,  July 
1983).  See also Gerry  Oster, "Labour  Relations  and  Demand  Relations:  A Case Study  of 
the 'Unemployment  Effect,  ' " Cambridge  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 4 (December  1980), 
pp. 337-48; Geoff Hodgson, "Theoretical  and  Political  Implications  of Variable  Produc- 
tivity," Cambridge  Journal of Economics, vol. 6 (September  1982), pp. 213-26; and 
Michele  I. Naples, "Production  Is Human  Activity:  A Social-Relations  Approach  to the 
Productivity  Slowdown," Working  Paper 4 (Economics Institute of the Center for 
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detected. The product  of these three  factors is the expected cost to the 
employee  of working  at less intensity  than  is expected  by management.23 
The  first  of the three  is the most  obvious. Since employers  in capitalist 
economies may not physically  coerce their  workers  or deprive  them of 
their liberty, one powerful instrument  of employer influence is dis- 
missal-the  threat  of which will depend  on the cost to workers  of losing 
their  jobs. The higher  the cost of job loss, the more  fearful  workers  will 
be of failure  to conform  to employers'  intentions. 
The  probability  of detection  depends  on the intensity  of supervision- 
that  is, surveillance  and  direction  of production  workers  on the  job. The 
probability  of dismissal  varies  inversely  with  the extent of formal  power 
of the employee based on unions  and other collective employee associ- 
ations  and  the difficulty  the employer  will have in replacing  the worker.  24 
The multiplicative  relation  among  these three  factors  implies  comple- 
mentarity,  as seems reasonable:  intense supervision  will do little good if 
there is no cost to loss of job or if the probability  of dismissal  is low, for 
example,  and  costlyjob-loss  conditions  will  have  little  effect  if employers 
are incapable  of detecting  and  dismissing  those deserving  punishment. 
These hypotheses suggest the following expression for the factors 
affecting  work  intensity: 
(1)  E = J  S *  D(U,  R), 
EJ, Es,  ED,  EJS,  EJD,  ESD>0,  Du  <  0, DR>  0, 
where 
E  =  index of the effectiveness of employer  control  over workers 
J  =  expected income loss resulting  from  job loss 
S  =  ratio  of supervisory-worker  hours  to production-worker  hours 
D  =  index of the probability  of dismissal  if detected  working  below 
management  expectations 
23. See Bowles, "The Production  Process  in a Competitive  Economy,"  for a formal 
argument  about  the multiplicative  nature  of this relationship. 
Our  formulation  here attempts  to model "objective"  or "material"  factors  affecting 
work intensity, and therefore  avoids treating  worker  attitudes  as purely "exogenous." 
We  think  that  this  approach  is preferable  to that  of analysts  such  as Norsworth  and  Zabala, 
in "Worker  Attitudes  and  the  Cost  of Production,  " who  implicitly  treat  "worker  attitudes" 
as a fully exogenous  factor  and do not seek to understand  what  determines  variations  in 
that  determinant  of costs and  productivity. 
24. The logic underlying  the second  of these conditions  is similar  to that  of the search- 
theoretic  analysis  of the conditions  affecting  employers'  decision  to hire  a new employee 
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U  =  level of collective worker membership  in unions or other 
employee associations 
R  =  index of conditions  affecting  the ease with  which  management 
believes it can replace  a dismissed  worker. 
Workermotivation  is likely  to constitute  the second  major  determinant 
of work intensity. If there are substantial  improvements  in workers' 
earnings  or  working  conditions  that  result  from  increases  in  their  intensity 
of work, for example, workers  may be more inclined  to cooperate  with 
efforts to boost productivity. Conversely, if they must accept lower 
wages to foster investment or suffer speedup and hazardous  working 
conditions  to permit  productivity  increases, they may be more  likely to 
intensify their resistance to employers' efforts to extract more labor 
activity. 
It seems likely, then, that 
(2)  M = M (W!, B, M*),  MW!,  MB, MM*  >  0, 
where 
M  =  index of workers'  motivation 
W! =  motivation-enhancing  factors  in workers'  earnings 
B  =  index of quality  of working  conditions 
M*  =  vector of any exogenous factors that positively influence 
workers'  job satisfaction. 
We can combine equations 1 and 2 to form a composite expression 
for the determination  of work intensity. Despite the obvious limitation 
that  variations  in  the level of work  intensity  cannot  be measured  directly, 
it then  becomes  possible  to specify  the  form  of the  functional  expressions 
implied  by 1  and  2 and,  as shown  below, to measure-albeit imperfectly- 
their several components. This further  step makes it possible to draw 
inferences  about  unmeasurable  variations  in work intensity  from varia- 
tions in factors that are likely to cause work intensity  to vary; thus we 
can incorporate  analyses  of the  factors  determining  the intensity  of work 
into a more  general  model  of the determinants  of productivity. 
INNOVATIVE  PRESSURE  ON  BUSINESS: 
THE  SCHUMPETER  EFFECT 
Mainstream  analyses of the aggregate  production  function  implicitly 
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of perfect competition presumed, the forces of competition remain 
constant and continuous for the individual  firm. As the production- 
possibility frontier  moves outward,  firms are forced to remain  on the 
frontier because of the unrelenting  force of continuing competitive 
pressure.  We call  this the assumption  of automatic  technical  adaptation. 
Marx and Schumpeter suggested a quite different conception of 
competition.  Marx  originally  argued  that  competition,  while  unrelenting, 
was more like warfare  than a harmony  of mutual  exchanges; far from 
acting as passive price-takers,  firms  engage continuously  in attack  and 
counterattack,  in  foray  and  retreat.25  Schumpeter  substantially  extended 
these insights.  He suggested  that  innovative  breakthroughs  create tran- 
sitory monopoly  power and generate  quasi rents to be collected by the 
innovator, so that subsequently  competitors  are compelled to imitate 
those innovations. In later work on business cycles and long waves, 
Schumpeter  argued  that  there  are  periodic  waves of corporate  innovation 
and entrepreneurial  energy. These waves of innovation also unleash, 
according  to Schumpeter, "gales of creative destruction." The firms 
least able to ride  the waves of innovation  fall behind  or fail.26 
These insights suggest that variations in innovative pressures on 
business substantially  affect the level and growth  of aggregate  produc- 
tivity. Automatic  technical adaptation  to exogenously generated  tech- 
nical progress  implies, other  things  being equal, a relatively  steady rate 
of  adaptation to  exogenously generated expansion of productivity- 
enhancing  knowledge.  If, however, there are variations  in the pressure 
on firms to adopt new methods for improving  productive efficiency, 
exogenously generated  technical  knowledge, even if growing  at a con- 
stant rate, will not lead to  a  steady rate of  increase in aggregate 
productivity.  When competitive  pressures  are high, other things being 
equal, productivity  growth  will also increase. When competitive pres- 
sures slacken, productivity  growth  is also likely to moderate.27 
25. For useful discussions  of Marx's  conception  of competition  see Anwar  Shaikh, 
"Political Economy and Capitalism:  Notes on Dobb's Theory of Crisis," Cambridge 
Journal  of Economics,  vol. 2 (June 1978),  pp. 233-51; and Willi  Semmler,  Competition 
and  Monopoly  (Columbia  University  Press,  forthcoming). 
26.  See  Joseph  A.  Schumpeter,  The Theory of  Economic  Development  (Harvard 
University  Press, 1934);  Business  Cycles,  vol. 1 (McGraw-Hill,  1939);  and "The Analysis 
of Economic Change," Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol.  17 (May 1935), pp. 2-10. 
27. We should  note as an addendum  that  our  analysis  of innovative  pressures  (and  of 
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This hypothesis can be translated  into a form that permits direct 
incorporation  into a model of aggregate productivity  growth. Many 
neoclassical growth  models suggest  that technical  advance contributes 
to aggregate  productivity  growth  exponentially  over time, reflected in 
the exponential adjustment  factor, eX'. Relying on what we call the 
Schumpeter  effect, we substitute  a behavioral  relation  for the constant 
parameter  X. 
We begin with the proposition  that the actual rate of implemented 
technical  progress  is a function  of both  the exogenous  growth  of potential 
technical progress and the current levels of innovative pressure on 
business: 
(3)  A =  A* +  VLC,  L  >  0, 
where 
A =  actual  rate  of technical  progress 
A* =  rate  of growth  of exogenously  generated  technical  knowledge 
11 =  coefficient  of a firm's  adjustment  to variations  in competitive 
pressure 
C  =  index of the (variable)  level of competitive  pressure  on firms 
to improve  productive  efficiency, with a mean of C equal  to 
zero. 
This formulation  suggests that the neoclassical model is simply a 
special  case: if competitive  pressure  were constant  (and  equal  to C), the 
business  and  economics  literature.  One emphasizes  changes  in business  attitudes  or risk 
preferences  as a source  of variations  in  innovative  pressure.  This  is especially  characteristic 
of recent  journalistic  discussions  of management  failures  in the United  States. A second, 
following  the Schumpeterian  lead, places emphasis  on purely  technical  determinants  of 
waves of innovative  pressure,  focusing  on bursts  of invention  and  subsequent  diffusion  of 
"epoch-making"  ideas. For a justifiably  critical review of this approach, see Edwin 
Mansfield,  "Long Waves and Technological  Innovation,"  American  Economic  Review, 
vol. 73 (May 1983,  Papers  and Proceedings,  1982),  pp. 141-45. We argue  in contrast  that 
long swings  in innovative  pressure  reflect  and  are  conditioned  by the construction  of new 
social structures  of accumulation  and the long periods  of expansion  they support.  We 
concentrate,  in other words, on structural  forces affecting  innovative  pressures  rather 
than  on changes  in attitudes  or trends  in technical  inventiveness.  For  further  elaboration, 
see David  M. Gordon,  Richard  Edwards,  and Michael  Reich, Segmented  Work,  Divided 
Workers: The Historical  Transformation  of  Labor  in  the  United  States  (Cambridge 
University Press, 1982),  chap. 2; and David M. Gordon, Thomas E. Weisskopf, and 
Samuel  Bowles, "Long Swings and the Nonreproductive  Cycle," American  Economic 
Review, vol. 73 (May 1983, Papers and Proceedings,  1982), pp. 152-57. 398  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
actual  rate of growth  of technical  knowledge  would be equal to X*.  But 
if competitive pressure were not constant, then C would vary, and X 
would  thus diverge  from  X*. 
These propositions further suggest that variations in innovative 
pressure  have a cumulative  effect, augmenting  or eroding  a firm's  incli- 
nations  to innovate  over a period  of years  defined  primarily  by the firm's 
planning  horizons and the average amortization  period of technical 
innovations. Short-term  cyclical variations  in innovative pressure are 
less likely to affect a firm's  behavior  than  sustained  trends  toward  more 
or less intense  competition  over substantially  longer  periods. Assuming 
that we can find a reasonable proxy measure for C and that we can 
properly  cumulate  its effects over time, the Schumpeter  effect should 
be  just as susceptible  to analytic  investigation  as the Marx  effect. 
TECHNICAL  FACTORS  AFFECTING  PRODUCTIVITY 
Our attention to the Marx and Schumpeter effects is in no way 
intended  to diminish  the importance  of relations  highlighted  by the more 
familiar  technical model of productivity.  We expect that the level of 
capacity utilization,  the capital  intensity of production,  and variations 
in the relative  prices of external  inputs  all affect aggregate  productivity. 
We note here the main  directions  of effect. 
Capacity Utilization. There are several important  reasons for ex- 
pecting covariation  between aggregate  labor  productivity  and capacity 
utilization.  First, there might  be hoarding  of nonproduction  workers  in 
business-cycle downturns,  which would lead to reduced  labor produc- 
tivity (per purchased  total labor hours) during  recession. Second, and 
similarly,  there would be underutilization  of owned fixed-capital  stock 
during  a downturn,  which would lead to decreased  actual  use of capital 
inputs in production.  Third, the efficiency of the production  process 
itself-including the efficiency  of utilized  capital  inputs  and  of the labor- 
management  apparatus-might be reduced if capacity utilization fell 
below some targeted  or warranted  level for which  productive  operations 
had been designed. Fourth, it is conceivable that there might  be some 
hoarding  of production  workers  during  the cycle, with  explicit  or implicit 
contracts  preventing  the immediate  layoffs  that  lower  capacity  utilization 
might otherwise cause. A fifth factor might have the opposite effect: 
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efficient  capital  equipment  and  thus  increase  the average  productiveness 
of capital  goods still in use. 
In  the subsequent  analysis  we control  for  the first  two factors  directly. 
Hoarding  of nonproduction  workers  during  the business cycle is taken 
into  account  by expressing  productivity  as output  per  production-worker 
hour. Variable  utilization of the fixed capital stock over the cycle is 
tested  by adjusting  measures  of the owned  fixed-capital  stock  for  variable 
levels of utilization. 
The net effect of the last three factors is impossible to anticipate  a 
priori.  We weigh  the relative  importance  of offsetting  possible effects of 
lower capacity  utilization  by testing directly  for the direction  of covar- 
iation, other  things  equal, between aggregate  productivity  and the level 
of capacity  utilization.  We control  for the possibility  of sluggish  adjust- 
ment  of staffing  levels to the business  cycle by postulating  that  aggregate 
productivity  will also vary directly  with the rate of change of capacity 
utilization;  the  more  rapidly  utilization  levels are  increasing,  for  example, 
the greater  is the likelihood that firms  will make increasingly  efficient 
use of the resources  and the employees that  might  have been partly  idle 
during  periods of contraction.  These controls are obviously rough  and 
imperfect,  but they should at least allow testing of hypotheses about 
other possible determinants  of aggregate  productivity  by provisionally 
controlling  for the possible  influence  of variations  in capacity  utilization. 
Capital Intensity.  Aggregate labor productivity  clearly varies  with 
the capital  intensity  of production.  But  aggregate  capital  intensity  cannot 
be measured  by the aggregate  ratio of the (value of the) owned capital 
stock to labor hours for at least two important  reasons. First, some 
portion  of the owned capital  stock may not enter  into production;  it lies 
unutilized as a result of fluctuations  in aggregate effective demand. 
Second, there may be significant  variations  in the average  efficiency of 
effective capital services, resulting primarily  from the possibility of 
obsolescence in the capital  stock not captured  by the usual  adjustments 
for depreciation. 
These considerations  clearly suggest the need for two independent 
kinds  of adjustments  to the  aggregate  capital-labor  ratio-one for  variable 
levels of utilization  and another  for factors that may lead to variable 
rates  of obsolescence. We pursue  both kinds  of adjustments  in succeed- 
ing sections of the paper,  although  the former  is much  easier to specify 
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External  Input Prices.  Several economists, particularly  Michael Bruno 
and Jeffrey Sachs,  have recently focused  on the effects  of input price 
shocks on productivity growth in the United States and other advanced 
economies.  Bruno states their conclusion  quite simply: 
For a raw-material  intensive activity the conventional  two-factor  view of the 
production  process is only valid when the relative  price of the raw material  (in 
output  units)  or its unit  input  stays constant.  When  its relative  price rises and it 
is a complementary  factor of production,  productivity  per unit of the other 
factors, labour  and  capital,  must  fall.28 
We agree with the microeconomic  presuppositions  of this argument; 
increases  in external input-prices of crude and intermediate materials 
are likely to reduce the productivity of labor and capital inputs. We are 
concerned,  however,  about the way in which this insight is applied and 
about the specification of relative input prices in the recent literature. 
We make an effort in subsequent sections to improve upon the empirical 
specification of this effect.29 
A Composite Social Model of Aggregate Productivity 
It is now possible  to combine both social and technical  dimensions 
into  a  composite  model  of  aggregate  labor  productivity.  We  follow 
convention  and express productivity as a multiplicative function of the 
several inputs and social factors that are likely to affect it.30 The basic 
model becomes 
28. Michael  Bruno,  "World  Shocks, Macroeconomic  Response,  and  the Productivity 
Puzzle," Working  Paper  942R  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  July 1982),  p. 2. 
See also Michael Bruno, "Raw Materials,  Profits, and the Productivity  Slowdown," 
Working  Paper  660 (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  April  1981);  and  Bruno  and 
Jeffrey  Sachs, "Input  Price  Shocks  and  the Slowdown  in Economic  Growth:  The Case of 
U.K. Manufacturing,"  Working  Paper 851 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
February  1982). 
29. We note for purposes of clarity that Bruno actually identifies  two alternative 
possible effects of relative  external  price increases  on productivity  growth. One is the 
substitution  effect, illustrated  by the quotation  in the text. The other focuses on the 
measurement  bias  resulting  from  the standard  procedure  of double  deflation  of gross  output 
data  in the national  accounts.  As Bruno  notes, it is difficult  to separate  the two. 
30. The  crucial  assumption  in  this  formulation  that  cannot  be avoided  is that  of constant 
returns  to scale, and  we comment  on the relevance  of and  evidence  for this assumption  as 
the econometric  tests proceed.  See note  54 below. For  a detailed  critique  of the traditional 
inferences  about  aggregate  production  functions,  see Anwar  Shaikh,  "Laws  of Production 
and Laws of Algebra:  The Humbug  Production  Function,"  Review of Economics and 
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(4)  Q =  AGa (1 +  G')O2 K*P L*y PJ  e(x*  +  Lc)t 
with 
OX1 (X2  ,  7,  t  ,  > 0,  8 <  0, 
where 
Q  =  total output  per unit  of purchased  production  labor  inputs 
A  =  positive constant 
G  =  level of aggregate  capacity  utilization 
G'  =  index of rate  of change  of that  utilization 
K*  =  utilized,  nonobsolescent  capital  inputs  per  hour  of purchased 
production  labor  inputs 
L*  =  amount  of effective labor  inputs  per hour  of purchased  labor 
inputs 
=  index of the relative  price  of external  inputs 
C  =  index of the level of innovative  pressure  on firms  to improve 
productive  efficiency. 
Comparative  hypotheses about  the sources of the productivity  slow- 
down require  that  we move from  this expression  for determinants  of the 
level of aggregate  labor  productivity  to afocus on changes  in  productivity 
over time. We denote  x as the logarithmic  rate  of change  of X per unit  of 
time, substitute  from  expressions 1 and  2 into 4, and introduce  Yi  and Y2 
as coefficients of adjustment  mediating  the two determinants  of work 
intensity. The following general expression for changes in aggregate 
labor  productivity  over time is thus obtained: 
(5)  q  X*  +  Otlg +  ot2Ag +  3k*  +  yle[J  S  D(U, R)] 
+  Y2m  (W!, B, M*) + 8px +  ILC, 
with 
X,  al,  X2,  ,  Y1 _Y29  F >  09  8 < 0- 
We next provide a specification  and econometric estimation  of our 
general  social model  of productivity  growth,  as summarized  by equation 
5. We also compare  its explanatory  power with that of models derived 
from the more conventional  technical explanations  of the productivity 
slowdown. 
MODEL  SPECIFICATION 
We estimate the model with annual  data  for the postwar  years from 
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sought to estimate over the full range of completed business cycles 
during  the postwar  period  for which all necessary data were available. 
(Complete  annual-but not quarterly-data series are available  for our 
desired  variables  only between 1948  and 1979.)  We focus on the nonfarm 
private  business sector in the United States, excluding  both the farm 
and  government  sectors on the grounds  that  their  dynamics  and  produc- 
tion processes are not adequately  captured  by the model developed in 
the  previous  section. We review  our  specification  of each of the  variables 
in our  general  social model  in the order  in which  they appear  in equation 
5. (See the appendix  for full documentation  of the data sources.) When 
we introduce  variables, we normally  define them first in terms of their 
levels, referring  back  to the original  expression  for the level of aggregate 
productivity  in equation  4, and  then transform  them  into rates  of change 
for estimation  of equation  5. 
Hourly Output. We specify the dependent variable as the rate of 
change of real output per hour of production-worker  employment.  To 
obtain this measure  of hourly  output, we use basic indexes of nonfarm 
business output  and total hours  by the Bureau  of Labor Statistics, and 
adjust  total hours  in the denominator  by the ratio  of production-worker 
employment  to total employment." 
We define  the productivity  measure  in relation  to production-worker 
hours, rather  than  total worker  hours, in order  to focus on the differing 
activities  of directly  productive  labor,  on the one hand,  and  surveillance 
or supervisory  labor,  on the other. (We  use standard  BLS data  to define 
production  workers  as "production"  employees  in the goods-producing 
sectors and as "nonsupervisory"  employees in the rest of the nonfarm 
private  business sector. Workers  in this combined  category  comprised 
31. Some economists are skeptical  of "value-added"  measures  of productivity  and 
prefer  to limit  themselves  to "physical"  measures  of output  in the numerator.  The latter 
are available  in the United States only through  the Federal Reserve Board series on 
manufacturing  output. Although we  recognize that value measures introduce some 
potential  "noise" into the measure  of total output,  we feel comfortable  with the value- 
added measures  for the purposes  of this paper  for two reasons. First, there are some 
obvious advantages  to being able to develop analyses for the entire nonfarm  private 
business sector, but physical measures  of output  are available  only for manufacturing. 
Second, and  much  more  important,  it does not appear  that  the physical  and  value-added 
series tell a substantially  different  story for the manufacturing  sector for the postwar 
economy. For  one useful  comparison  of the two series  for  manufacturing,  see Tom  Michl, 
"The Lowdown on the Slowdown" (New School for Social Research, Department  of 
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81.3 percent of total private employment in 1980.) This choice of a 
denominator  for the output  variable  recognizes that the specific nature 
of the contribution  of supervisory  labor to production  is qualitatively 
different  from  that  of production  workers;  its contribution  lies substan- 
tially in extracting  work from directly productive  workers rather  than 
directly transforming  raw materials  and intermediate  goods into final 
outputs. We show below that our empirical results are robust with 
respect  to this and alternative  specifications  of the dependent  variable. 
Capacity Utilization. The Bureau  of Economic  Analysis data  on the 
ratio  of actual  to potential  GNP, as adjusted  periodically  by the Council 
of Economic Advisers, are used to measure economy-wide capacity 
utilization.  This  ratio  tracks  the year-to-year  movements  of the business 
cycle and  is used to measure  the impact  of those fluctuations  on aggregate 
labor  productivity.32 
Capital Intensity. The fixed-capital  stock in the nonfarm  business 
sector  is taken  from  the recently  published  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis 
data. Conforming  to our definition  of hourly  output  and of productive- 
labor  inputs,  we divide  the capital  stock  by estimated  production-worker 
hours to derive an estimate of the capital-labor  ratio. Because only 
utilized  capital  inputs  augment  hourly  productivity,  we adjust  the capital 
stock by the rate of capacity utilization  (as defined  above), with Ku  as 
the utilized capital-labor  ratio. This procedure  means that the rate of 
change  of capacity  utilization  enters  the model  twice-once  directly  and 
once as a component  of the measure  of the rate  of change  in the utilized 
capital-labor  ratio;  it also means  we have to interpret  the coefficients  on 
both variables  carefully. This formulation  is nonetheless preferred  for 
the purposes of initial  estimation  because it more directly assesses the 
contribution  of fluctuations  in the capital  services actually  applied  in the 
production  process than  a measure  of the unadjusted  capital-labor  ratio 
or a measure  of the ratio  of the owned capital  stock to potential  GNP.33 
Again, we  examine the sensitivity of the results to this particular 
formulation  in subsequent  estimations. 
32. We also considered  and  explored  two alternative  measures  of capacity  utilization 
and  cyclical  variation-the Federal  Reserve  Board's  series  on capacity  utilization  and  the 
aggregate  unemployment  rate. The disadvantage  of the former  is that  it is only available 
for  manufacturing,  and  not  for  the total  nonfarm  private  business  sector;  the disadvantage 
of the latter  is that  it reflects  effects of both  labor  supply  and  demand. 
33. We share  some of the skepticism  of Cambridge,  England,  about  the plausibility  of 
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The issue of the relative  obsolescence of capital  is more  complicated, 
and there are no clear guidelines  in the available  literature.34  Following 
the interesting suggestions of Martin  Neil Baily, we have formulated 
several  provisional  specifications  of the hypothesis  that  the contribution 
of capital services depends  on variations  in the degree of obsolescence 
of the  capital  stock, but  we discuss  these  additional  tests in  the succeeding 
section because of their  speculative  (and  largely  inconclusive)  nature. 
WorkIntensity.  We specify  the Marx  effect through  direct  estimation 
of all components  of L* included  in equation  5 for which it was possible 
to obtain  annual  empirical  data. 
The effectiveness of employer  control  is a function  of three  variables, 
J, S, and D. Relying on separate  work by Juliet B. Schor and Samuel 
Bowles, we measure  J, the cost of job loss, by a composite measure  of 
the expected income  loss resulting  from  job termination:35 
(6)  J  =  Ud [(W  -  WR)(W  +  WS)], 
where 
Ud  =  average  unemployment  duration  for  job losers, expressed  as 
a fraction  of a year 
W =  average  production-worker  weekly after-tax  earnings 
criticisms  are  more  relevant  for  the debates  about  the marginal  productivity  of capital  than 
for the econometric  investigation  of alternative  hypotheses  concerning  the productivity 
slowdown. As long as the biases in aggregate  value measures  of the capital stock are 
relatively  consistent over time, for example, then changes in the rate of growth  of the 
measured  capital  stock, and therefore  in our measure  of capital  intensity, are likely to 
provide  plausible  indications  of changes in the physical  ratios of capital  goods to labor 
hours  and, consequently,  of changes  in the contribution  of capital  goods to the produc- 
tiveness of labor  hours  over time. 
We also considered  formulating  our variable  for capital  intensity  as the ratio of the 
owned  capital  stock  to potential  output,  with  an  eye on trends  in potential  (but  not actually 
utilized)  capital  intensity.  This seems to us a theoretically  inferior  specification  since it is 
distorted  by lags in the adjustment  of investment  (and  therefore  changes  in the value of 
the capital  stock) to changes  in the trend  growth  of both output  and  productivity;  it does 
not directly  measure  the value  of the capital  stock, which  enhances  labor  productivity,  but 
focuses instead on the capital  that might  augment  it. We tested this specification  in our 
estimation  of equation  8, in any  case, and  the capital  intensity  variable  became  statistically 
insignificant. 
34. See the discussion  in Baily, "Productivity  and  the Services  of Capital  and  Labor"; 
and Barry  P. Bosworth, "Capital  Formation  and Economic  Policy," BPEA,  2:1982,  pp. 
286-90. 
35. See Juliet B. Schor and Samuel  Bowles, "Conflict  in the Employment  Relation 
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WR =  average  weekly income-replacing  benefits  received by those 
without  work, including  a weighted  allocation  of unemploy- 
ment compensation, public assistance, food stamps, and 
medical  care benefits,  to reflect  relative  worker  eligibility  for 
those different  streams  of benefits 
Ws =  average weekly nonincome-replacing  benefits, particularly 
including  education  and medical  benefits. 
Defined  in this way, J measures  the fraction  of a year's overall income 
(including  both wages and government  expenditures)  that a worker  can 
expect to forgo  as a result  ofjob loss. 
The intensity of supervision,  S, is measured  as the ratio of nonpro- 
duction-worker  hours  to production-worker  hours  in the  nonfarm  private 
business sector.36 
We measure D,  the probability  of dismissal should a worker be 
detected performing  at a level of intensity  below management  expecta- 
tions, by specifying the two components identified  in equation 1. We 
define U as the percentage of the nonagricultural  labor force that is 
unionized.  We define  R as the ratio  of trend  production-worker  employ- 
ment  to its current  levels; the greater  is the ratio  of trend  to actual  levels, 
the more slack  there is in the current  production-worker  labor  force and 
therefore the easier it is to replace a production  worker who is not 
cooperative  on the  job. 
36. Many  who have heard  us present  our work  have questioned  the relevance  of this 
measure  of the intensity  of supervision  on the grounds  that  it includes  too many  technical 
workers  to warrant  its use as a proxy  for supervisory  labor.  We  rely  on the data  distinction 
in  standard  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  compilations  between  production  and  nonproduction 
employees in the goods sectors and nonsupervisory  and supervisory  employees in the 
service sectors. It is true that some of the employees designated  by official data as 
nonproduction  or supervisory personnel are not managers, clerical supervisors, or 
foremen,  but  by far  the largest  proportion  do indeed  fall  into those three  categories. 
In 1980,  for example,  there  were 13.9  million  nonproduction  and  supervisory  workers 
on private  nonfarm  payrolls  as defined  by the BLS definitions  we apply  in our statistical 
work.  In  that  same  year,  according  to the  more  detailed  three-digit  occupational  categories 
of the U.S. Bureau  of the  Census,  there  were  approximately  11.5  million  managers,  clerical 
supervisors,  and  blue-collar  supervisors  in  the  private  sector.  (This  approximation  assumes 
that the same proportions  of workers  worked  in those categories  in both the public  and 
private  sectors.) Even in 1980,  therefore,  at the end of a long period  of rapid  growth  in 
technical  employment  it remained  true that at least 83 percent of workers  in this data 
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In the absence of compelling  theoretical  guidelines,  a multiplicative 
form  for  D is arbitrarily  adopted: 
(7)  D  =  R  \/(Lp!Lp,)!U, 
where  U is defined  as above and  Lp measures  the time trend  of produc- 
tion-worker  hours,  Lp,, for 1948-79.37 
In this paper  we focus on two of the three variables  contained  in the 
functional  expression  for  changes  in workers'  motivation,  m, in equation 
5. We measure  w!  by the rate  of change  in  workers'  real  spendable  hourly 
earnings,  hypothesizing  that workers' motivation  is higher, as is their 
work intensity, the more rapidly  their take-home  pay increases.38  We 
express an imperfect  proxy for B, the index of the quality  of working 
conditions, as the inverse of Z, the industrial  accident rate; thus B = 
Z-1. We postulate an inverse relation between the accident rate and 
workers'  motivation.  According  to this  formulation,  rising  accident  rates 
are likely to erode the quality  of working  conditions, reduce workers' 
motivation,  and  therefore  diminish  work  intensity.39 
We had hoped to find  an annual  measure  of workers'  job satisfaction 
to serve as a proxy for M*, which also affects worker  motivation.  We 
could  not find  a suitable  annual  series  for  the entire  period  of observation 
and  thus were unable  to include  a measure  of M* in our equation.40 
37. We plan  to explore  the effects of a variety  of possible specifications  in the future; 
for  the  moment,  since  the  variable  J carries  the  greatest  statistical  weight  in  the  econometric 
applications  reported  below, we retain  this simple  multiplicative  definition  and save for 
other  efforts  a more  careful  analysis  of the most  appropriate  form  of interaction  among  the 
two constituent  variables  of D. We take  the square  root  of the expression  in equation  7 to 
avoid  artificial  amplification  of the variance  of the composite  variable. 
38. This hypothesis  seems particularly  relevant  for unionized  production  workers  in 
the United States in the postwar  period  because it corresponds  to the logic of collective 
bargaining  over the distribution  of the dividends  from  productivity  growth-to  what has 
usually  been called, indeed,  productivity  bargaining. 
39. One could alternatively  hypothesize that the accident rate primarily  reflects 
speedup  on the  job and  that  a rising  accident  rate  would  therefore  be accompanied  by an 
increase  in work  intensity,  not  a decrease.  The  actual  estimated  results  for  the effects of Z 
should  help to discriminate  between these two possibilities:  a negative  and statistically 
significant  effect  of Z on hourly  output  would  suggest  that  the negative  impact  of a speedup 
on worker  motivation  swamps  any  direct  positive  effect  on work  intensity,  while  a positive 
effect on productivity  would  indicate  the opposite. 
40. We note with interest,  however,  that  the series on job satisfaction  available  on a 
consistent  though  intermittent  basis since  the mid-1950s  reports  trends  that  are  parallel  to 
trends  in productivity  growth  and support  our hypotheses  about spreading  disaffection 
since the 1960s.  See the first  major  section  of this paper  and  note 7 above. T. Weisskopf,  S. Bowles, and D. Gordon  407 
External Input Costs.  We begin by measuring  the relative price of 
external  input costs by Pf, an index of the relative price of fuels. This 
choice reflects the importance  placed on oil prices in the mainstream 
literature.41  We are not content  with this measure,  however. 
A variety of external inputs exists whose supply can be subject to 
shocks and  whose relative  price might  therefore  increase  and  adversely 
affect the productivity  of other  factors of production.  For the domestic 
private  nonfarm  business sector  in the postwar  period,  such shocks  have 
occurred in the production  and pricing of many nonagricultural  raw 
materials,  not just oil and coal. This has been due to both foreign and 
domestic  effects. Internationally,  OPEC  and  other suppliers  have com- 
bined  to produce sharp  increases in the price of imported  oil and a few 
other  imported  crude  materials.  Domestically,  popular  resistance  to the 
physical  and environmental  effects of energy  production-embodied in 
the movement  for environmental  regulation,  the campaign  against  nu- 
clear power, and the mine workers' struggles  for greater  safety in the 
mines-have  combined to increase the relative production costs of 
domestic  nonagricultural  crude  materials.  These  two developments  have 
jointly affected the relative costs of external inputs consumed by the 
domestic  private  nonfarm  business economy.42 
We capture this effect with an alternative variable representing 
external  input  prices,  Px, measured  as the relative  cost of nonagricultural 
crude  materials,  which we calculate  by dividing  an index of the prices  of 
fuels and  other crude materials  (excluding  foodstuffs  and  feedstuffs)  by 
the aggregate  GDP  price  deflator. 
The  performance  of these  two alternative  measures  of relative  external 
input  prices  is compared  throughout  the rest of the analysis. Even at this 
41. For a summary  of much of this literature  see Ernst R. Berndt, "Energy Price 
Increases  and the Productivity  Slowdown  in United States Manufacturing,"  in Federal 
Reserve  Bank of Boston,  The Decline  in Productivity Growth, pp. 60-89.  Technically  it 
ought  to be possible  to capture  the substitution  effect  of relative  external  input  price  shocks 
by measuring  changes  in the  relative  quantities  of energy  inputs,  rather  than  in their  prices, 
and to rely on price measures  to test for the effect of measurement  bias resulting  from 
double deflation  of gross output measures  (see note 29 above). In practice, however, 
quantity  measures  do not  provide  additional  explanatory  power  in the econometric  results 
reported  below, so that we are constrained  for empirical  reasons  to rely exclusively on 
relative  price  measures  of this effect. See the text below  for a discussion  of the effect of a 
quantity  measure  of energy  inputs. 
42. See the discussion  in Bowles, Gordon,  and Weisskopf,  Beyond  the Waste  Land, 
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stage of initial specification,  the principal  differences  are evident. The 
index of relative fuel prices pays attention to only one category of 
external  inputs and therefore  tends to confuse a particular  instance of 
recent  price  shock  with the more  general  political  economic  problems  of 
sluggish supply responses, occupational safety, and environmental 
problems.  The fuels covered in the index of relative  fuel prices, indeed, 
account  for only about  one-third  (by value weights)  of the total value of 
inputs  included  in the nonagricultural  crude-material  price index. This 
index, because of its focus on the price of imported  oil, also tends to 
give too much  attention  to a single  type of foreign  shock-the  successive 
OPEC  price  hikes-and  too little  to other  domestic  movements  that  also 
affect  relative  input  prices of crude  materials.4 
Innovative  Pressure  on  Business.  Following  Schumpeter's  clues 
about creative destruction,  we focus on the rate of business failures  as 
an indirect  measure  of the pressure  on business  firms  to remain  compet- 
itive and adopt available  technical innovations.  Data for the business- 
failure  rate are available  on a continuous  basis throughout  the postwar 
period.  Use of this variable  does not imply  that  business  failures  are the 
only  or  most  important  cause  of productive  innovation  but  that  variations 
in the business-failure  rate reflect and themselves directly covary with 
a wide variety  of factors  affecting  business  innovation  for which  contin- 
uous annual  data  are not available  throughout  the postwar  period. 
Further  applying  the supposition  that  variations  in  innovative  pressure 
have cumulative  effects, we transform  the business-failure  rate  to elimi- 
nate  short-term  cyclical  variation  and  to highlight  its more  secular  trends  . 
We  residualize  the business  failure  rate  on the  level of capacity  utilization 
and then take a three-year (end-of-period)  moving average of  this 
residualized  variable.  We label this variable  C*. This involves the hy- 
pothesis that recent variations  in the business-failure  rate that are not 
simply  functions of fluctuations  in the level of capacity utilization  can 
provide  a proxy measure  of recent trends  in the intensity  of innovative 
pressure  on firms.44  We further  test the robustness  of this specification 
43. We place heavy emphasis  in our book on the role of domestic  and international 
"popular  resistance"  as a source  of rising  external  input  prices  after  the mid-1960s.  This 
involves an argument  about  and  an interpretation  of our  variable  for external  input  prices 
that cannot  be further  explored  through  the econometrics  of this paper;  see ibid., chaps. 
4 and  6. 
44. In background  work  for this paper  we developed  a model  of the failure  rate that 
supports  this interpretation.  We show that, when one controls  for the level of capacity T. Weisskopf,  S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  409 
by exploring  several alternative  variables  based on the business-failure 
rate. 
EMPIRICAL  ESTIMATION 
Based on these variable  definitions,  we arrive  at a final  specification 
of equation  5 for the purposes  of initial  econometric  estimation: 
(8)  q =A*  + Otlg  +  t2Ag +f3k,,  +  Pyle 
+  'y2  IAw!  +  'Y22Z  +  bPx  +  pC*, 
where the variables are defined as above. We hypothesize that the 
coefficients  X*, xtl,  (X2, ,Yi  lY21,  and  p. are  positive and  that  Y22 and 8 are 
negative.  As in standard  econometric  estimation,  we assume  a stochastic 
component  in the dependent  variable,  with  u, distributed  with  zero mean 
and  C2 variance.45 
Two considerations influenced the empirical  work: first, since we 
could not assume a priori  that our hypotheses about the effects of our 
unfamiliar  and  unconventional  "social" variables  were associated  with 
changes in aggregate  productivity,  it seemed crucial to test these hy- 
potheses against  the null  hypothesis  of no significant  statistical  associa- 
tion.46  Furthermore, although we  preferred to  estimate equation 8 
directly, rather  than  use a modified  version of the aggregate  production 
function  with output  as the dependent  variable  and a measure  of labor 
utilization  and the cost of capital, variations  in the failure  rate are almost completely 
explained  by trends  in capital  intensity,  and  a trend  term  that  closely mirrors  the pattern 
reflected  in figure  2-suggesting a smooth  and inverted  U-shape  trajectory  in the deter- 
minants  of the failure  rate  in the postwar  period. 
We chose a three-year  period  for the moving  average  of the failure  rate  because  this is 
the length  of the period  over which  past values of the rate  are significant  in explaining  its 
current  values  in an autoregressive  estimation. 
45. We  use ordinary  least  squares  estimation  in  the  tests reported  here,  a simple  choice 
that does not appear  to require  emendation  as a result  of the specification  or the results 
themselves.  See the text below  for  comments  on potential  simultaneous  equation  bias  and 
autocorrelation. 
We add here the more inclusive measure  of external  input prices, p,, because we 
believe it better captures  the political  economic determinants  of variations  in external 
input  prices. Below we compare  its performance  with  the narrower  measure,  pf. 
46. One of the most glaring  presumptions  of the accounting-method  approach  is its 
axiomatic  application  of the marginal-productivity  theory  of wages  to the adjustments  for 
"quality"  in estimating  labor.  See the critical  discussion  of this procedure  in the section 
entitled  "Extensions  and  Competing  Hypotheses"  below. 410  Brookings Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
hours on the right-hand  side of the equation, we test the sensitivity of 
our results  to this particular  specification.47 
We show below the average values for the dependent  variable,  the 
average  annual  growth  in real output  per production-worker  hour, for 
the entire period, 1948-79, and for three subperiods  in which, as the 
previous literature  attests, the productivity  slowdown is most clearly 
revealed.48  These data are consistent with other estimates in the litera- 
ture. Differences in estimates of  the timing and magnitude  of  the 
productivity  slowdown primarily  are in the levels of subperiod  growth 
rates. If we compare  our estimates with those of Martin  Neil Baily, for 
example, the productivity  growth rates estimated here are higher  for 
every subperiod,  but  the relative  magnitudes  of decline  from  one period 
to the next are roughly  comparable;  the higher  growth  rates estimated 
here are due to the use of production-worker  hours  as the denominator 
in the measure  of hourly  output,  since total  worker  hours  grew  at a more 
rapid  rate  than  production-worker  hours  during  the postwar  period.49 
Average annual 
rate of growth 
(percent) 
1948-79  2.34 
1948-66  2.87 
1966-73  2.19 
1973-79  0.85 
47. Our  preferred  specification  focuses directly  on the object  of analysis-variation in 
the rate of change  of productivity-and poses a more stringent  test for the explanatory 
power  of the various  independent  variables  in the analysis. 
One danger  of this specification,  of course, is that  we may compound  the problem  of 
potential  errors  in variables  by including  labor  hours  in the denominator  on both  the left- 
and right-hand  sides of the equation.  We test for this possible bias below by comparing 
our  basic  results  with  a specification  in which  only output  appears  on the left-hand  side of 
the equation  and  labor  hours  appears  as an independent  variable. 
48. Productivity  growth  is defined  as the average  annual  logarithmic  rate  of growth  of 
output per production-worker  hour. The averages are calculated  as the means of the 
individual  annual  growth  rates, since these are  the actual  observations  for the dependent 
variable  in subsequent  econometric  estimation.  See Bowles, Gordon,  and Weisskopf, 
Beyond  the Waste  Land,  chap.  2, for  furtherjustification  of these periods  for  comparison. 
49. See Baily, "Productivity  and the Services of Capital  and Labor," p. 9. Growth 
rates  for  the counterpart  to our  dependent  variable  defined  as output  per  total-worker  hour 
for the entire  period  and  the three  subperiods  reported  in table 1  were  2.08, 2.56, 2.10, and 
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Table 1.  A Social Model of Aggregate Productivity Growth in U.S.  Nonfarm Private 
Business, 1948-79a 
Equation 
Independent  variable  1-1  1-2  1-3  1-4  1-5  1-6  1-7 
Trend growth rate, X*  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.004  0.015  0.017  0.017 
(7.98)  (6.35)  (7.97)  (1.02)  (6.92)  (8.07)  (8.39) 
Capacity utilization 
g  0.485  0.519  0.449  0.419  0.408  0.442  0.415 
(4.80)  (4.43)  (4.68)  (4.58)  (3.47)  (4.48)  (4.41) 
Ag  0.074  0.049  0.082  0.094  0.091  0.125  0.103 
(1.33)  (0.78)  (1.48)  (1.74)  (1.50)  (2.29)  (1.96) 
Utilized  capital-labor ratio,  0.401  0.385  0.411  0.419  0.472  0.373  0.373 
k,,  (4.64)  (4.26)  (4.74)  (4.99)  (5.29)  (4.17)  (4.26) 
Effectiveness  of employers'  0.035  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
control,  e  (3.74) 
Real spendable earnings,  0.075  0.073  0.072  0.069  0.121  0.292b 
Avw!  (1.68)  (1.57)  (1.60)  (1.57)  (2.71)  (1.37) 
Accident  rate, z  -0.083  -0.088  -0.086  -0.087  -0.100  -0.081 
(-3.50)  (-3.38)  (-3.60)  (-3.74)  (-3.29)  (-3.23) 
Relative  extemal  input  -0.040  -0.042  -0.041  -0.037  -  0.013b  -0.048  -0.055 
prices, p,  (-2.13)  (-2.13)  (-2.14)  (-1.95)  (-0.52)  (-2.62)  (-3.27) 
Business  failure measure,  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.020b  0.012  0.010  0.008 
C*  (2.81)  (2.72)  (2.75)  (2.98)  (2.43)  (2.50)  (2.20) 
Cost of job  loss,j  . .  .  0.036  0.034  0.031  0.027  0.027  0.034 
(3.72)  (3.60)  (3.41)  (2.74)  (2.48)  (3.58) 
Supervision  intensity,  s  ...  0.001  ...  ...  ...  ...  . 
(0.01) 
Probability of dismissal,  d  ...  0.100  ...  ...  ..  .  ...  ... 
(1.20) 
Predicted job  satisfaction,  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.450 
i! !(3.74) 
Summary statistic 
1R2  0.913  0.908  0.910  0.914  0.893  0.906  0.909 
Standard error of 
estimate  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005 
Durbin-Watson  2.095  1.891  2.092  2.200  2.184  2.214  2.096 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  based on data cited in the appendix. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  rate of change  in output  per production-worker  hours,  measured  as change  in 
logs.  The independent  variables are all growth rates measured as change in logs,  with the exception  of C*, which is 
a level  variable,  and Ag and Aw!,  which are first differences  of changes  in logs.  Given  first differences,  the actual 
observations  are for 1949-79.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  The  values  for C* (equation  1-4), p,  (equation  1-5), and Au'! (equation  1-6) are for the  alternative  variables 
described  in the text. 
We present  in table 1  the results  of the direct  estimation  of equation  8 
and  several  variants  of it. We begin  in equation  1-1  with  the basic model. 
All coefficients have the expected signs. All independent  variables  are 
statistically significant (on one-tailed tests), with six variables at  1 
percent, two at 5 percent, and one, Ag, at 10 percent. The variance 
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aggregate productivity (rather than levels), and the Durbin-Watson 
statistic  allows us to accept the null  hypothesis  of zero autocorrelation. 
The second column presents results for the same model with e, the 
effectiveness of employer  control,  decomposed  into  its three  constituent 
variables. The model remains robust, with virtually  no change in the 
coefficients  on the other significant  independent  variables.  The cost-of- 
job-loss component  of e, the variablej, is highly significant  and clearly 
constitutes  the underlying  component  of e with the greatest  explanatory 
power;  its standardized  regression  coefficient  is actually  higher  than  the 
standardized  regression  coefficient  for e in equation  1-1  . The coefficient 
on dalso has  the  right  sign,  but  otherwise  performs  poorly.  The  coefficient 
for s, the rate of change of the intensity of supervision,  is statistically 
insignificant. 
We present  in the column  for 1-3  the results of equation  8 estimated 
with only  j included  as a measure  of variations  in e. As in equation 1-2, 
j is positive and significant,  with a coefficient near to the value for e 
reported  in 1-1,  and  the results  for the other  variables  remain  consistent. 
Given the essential equivalence  of the results  in 1-1, 1-2,  and 1-3,  we 
choose to work with the simpler version presented in equation 1-3. 
Although we believe that the version in 1-1, with the fully specified 
variable e, represents the theoretically correct representation  of the 
microeconomic  logic of our analysis of the effectiveness of employer 
control, we retain  the version in 1-3  for subsequent  statistical  analysis 
to avoid the possibility that some other components of e  with less 
powerful statistical effects might complicate these comparative and 
forecasting  exercises.50 
We turn next to  our proxy measure for innovative pressure on 
50. See Bowles, "Competitive  Wage  Determination,"  for further  theoretical  justifi- 
cation  for the use of J, our  measure  of the cost of  job loss. 
Some  readers  of an early  draft  have  expressed  concern  about  a possible  identity  in the 
relation  between  Q and  J in our  model  because  the expression  for  J includes  the wage  rate 
and there  is a close relation  between  the rates of change  of productivity  and the product 
wage (see equation  6). This concern  is misplaced,  however, because W  appears  in both 
the numerator  and  the denominator  of J. If the other  determinants  of J were constant  and 
small,  J would  fluctuate  around  a value  of 1.00,  rather  than  around  the value  of W.  In fact, 
variations  in J are dominated  by variations  in our measures  of unemployment  duration, 
income-replacing  payments,  and  nonincome-replacing  payments,  not  by changes  in either 
the product  wage or in our  measure  of real  spendable  hourly  earnings.  Indeed,  the simple 
correlation  coefficient  between the rate of change  of the product  wage and  J is actually 
negative. T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  413 
business. Assuming  for the moment  that the business-failure  rate con- 
stitutes the appropriate  basis for such a measure, we  test  several 
alternative  specifications  of this variable. We report  in 1-4 the results 
with  a simple  alternative  specification,  C', a nonresidualized,  three-year 
moving average of the business-failure  rate. The magnitude of the 
coefficients for C* and C' differ because the residualization  shifts the 
units  of measurement  on C*, but  the standardized  regression  coefficients 
are  almost  exactly equal  and  so are  their  levels of statistical  significance. 
This suggests, in other words, that our results are insensitive to the 
choice about whether or not to adjust  the business-failure  rate for its 
cyclical covariation  with the capacity  utilization  rate;  we prefer  such an 
adjustment  to focus attention  on longer-term  trends  in innovative  pres- 
sure.  We also test a five-year  moving  average  of the business-failure  rate 
and a specification  in which we treat the current  value of this rate as a 
two-year  autoregressive  distributed  lag  on past  values  of the same  rate- 
an alternative  measure  of the notion of cumulative  trends  in innovative 
pressure.  Both of these specifications,  not reported  here, yielded  equiv- 
alent results on both the innovative  pressure  variable  and on the other 
independent  variables  in the model.5" 
We consider  next our specification  of the variable  measuring  relative 
external  input  prices. Equation  1-5  reveals the results  of substituting  pf, 
the  variable  measuring  relative  fuel  prices,  forp. Although  its coefficient 
has the right  sign, it is quite small  and statistically  insignificant.  If, as we 
and many other economists suspect, movements in one or another 
component  of external  input  prices have dampened  productivity  growth 
since the mid-1960s, our measure of relative nonagricultural  crude- 
materials  prices appears  to capture  this effect more  adequately  than  the 
narrower  measure  of relative  fuel prices. 
51. We also explored  a definition  of the variable  based on net business  formations, 
taking  into account not only failures  but new enterprises.  The problem  with additional 
attention  to new enterprise  formation,  however, is that  it is almost  entirely  a function  of 
real interest  rates and appears  to have little connection  with other  dimensions  of macro- 
economic activity. The frequency  of net business formations  grew steadily during  the 
postwar  period, particularly  during  the years of low real interest  rates in the 1970s,  and 
does not appear  to have moved  in close relation  to other  factors  likely  to affect  aggregate 
productivity.  Failures  and net business  formations,  indeed, move in opposite  directions; 
the simple  correlation  between the frequency  of business  failures  and net formations  is 
- 0.47. We therefore  think  that  the  failure  rate  more  closely reflects  the underlying  factors 
that  affect  relative  success at modernization  and  innovation. 414  Br-ookinigs  Paper-s oni Economic  Activ'ity, 2:1983 
The two other "social" variables, zAw!  and z, also deserve further 
comment. Although  productivity  growth and wage growth are closely 
linked,  the introduction  of siw!, one of our indicators  of worker  motiva- 
tion, should  not introduce  simultaneous  equation  bias into our equation 
because it relates  the level of worker  motivation  (and  therefore  the level 
of work intensity and of aggregate  labor productivity)  to the rate of 
change in workers'  take-home  pay in equation  8. There  is no necessary 
statistical  relation  between  the first  and  second  derivatives  of a variable, 
so there  is no a priori  reason  to treat  siv'!  as an endogenous  variable  and 
to expect simultaneous  equation  bias as a result  of its inclusion  in 8. The 
simple correlation  coefficient between q and svit!  is only 0.37, barely 
more  than  half  the simple  correlation  between  q  and  uv!,  the  first  derivative 
of real  spendable  hourly  earnings. 
The  results  reported  for  equation  1-3  may  still  reflect  causality  running 
from  the rate  of growth  of productivity  to the rate  of growth  of real  wages 
(and  therefore, if even indirectly,  ZAw!).  We can test for this possibility 
by residualizing  Ai'!  on the rate of growth  of the product  wage (hourly 
compensation deflated by the GDP deflator)  and then including  that 
residualized  variable,  &\w!*  in 8.  (This  residualization  allows  us  to 
eliminate the portion of variations in sit'!  that are plausibly understood 
as endogenously  determined  along  with  q.) We present  the results  of this 
procedure in equation 1-6, in which we  substitute the residualized 
independent variable z\w!* for Z\w!. There is  some decrease in the 
coefficient  and  statistical  significance  of this  measure  of our  motivational 
hypothesis, but the variable  remains significant  at 10 percent and the 
rest of the results remain  robust. (There is little change in the results 
largely  because the simple  correlation  between zAw!  and rate of change 
of the product  wage is only 0.36.)52 
We would obviously have preferred  a measure of the quality of 
working  conditions  that covers the entire  nonfarm  private  sector rather 
than  just the industrial  accident rate, z. Lacking such a series, we are 
reasonably confident that trends in manufacturing  closely paralleled 
trends  in other sectors. During  the period  when industrial  accident  rates 
52.  We further estimated  Phillips curve relations with uw!  and Aeit!, respectively,  as 
dependent  variables,  and  the lagged  unemployment  rate  and  productivity  growth,  among 
others, as independent  variables.  While  such a model  explains  a large  portion  of annual 
variation  in wt,!-the  rate  of growth  of our  measure  of real  spendable  earnings-it explains 
only 10  percent  of the annual  variation  in Ait  ! (adjusted  for degrees  of freedom). T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  anid D.  Gor-don  41  5 
began  to rise after  the mid-1960s,  for example, there  was both rising  job 
dissatisfaction  and increasing  concern  about  working  conditions  among 
the workers  in white-collar  occupations.53 
There is one final  test of the adequacy  of Aivt!  and z as measures of 
factors affecting  worker  motivation.  As noted at the beginning  of this 
paper, one consistent data series on employee satisfaction  is available 
since the mid-1950s;  there are six observations  on this series over the 
period  of our  analysis  (see note  7). Despite  the  limited  degrees  offreedom, 
our two proxy variables  should  certainly  help explain variations  in the 
intermittent  variable  measuring  job satisfaction.  When  we regress  M!, 
this measure of job satisfaction, on W!  and Z, indeed, the two proxy 
variables  have the expected signs  and  explain  65 percent  of the variation 
in  M!. We  can  further  use the coefficients  from  this  regression  to generate 
an annual  series of predicted  job satisfaction  based on the annual  values 
for w! and Z. Equation 1-7 shows the results of substituting  the rate of 
change of this measure of predicted  job satisfaction  for zAw!  and z in 
equation 1-3. The coefficient  on in! is statistically  significant  and all the 
other  results  remain  robust.  This  further  strengthens  the conclusion  that 
the effects of &i'!! and z in equations 1-1  through  1-3  capture  to a large 
degree the effects of shifts in factors affecting  worker  motivation.  We 
retain  those variables  for subsequent  analysis, rather  than  our measure 
of predicted  job satisfaction, because the coefficients generating  that 
measure  are based on only six observations. 
The three columns of table 2 provide tests of the sensitivity of the 
results to the specification of the dependent variable. Equation 2-1 
replicates  1-3,  except that  total employee  hours,  rather  than  production- 
worker hours, are in the denominator  of productivity,  the dependent 
variable  (and, maintaining  consistency, in the index of k14,  the ratio of 
utilized  capital  to labor).  The model remains  robust,  with no significant 
changes  in coefficient  magnitude  or significance  between 1-3  and  2-1. 
The results of  decomposing the dependent variable specified in 
equation  8 appear  in equation  2-2. The dependent  variable  in 2-2 is y, the 
change  in output  in the nonfarm  private  business sector;  and  the change 
in production-worker  employment,  4p,  is added  to the right-hand  side as 
an additional  independent  variable. We also convert the measure of 
53. See Quality  of Work  Life (Institute  for Social Research,  University  of Michigan, 
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Table 2.  Alternative Dependent Variables in the Social Model of Productivity Growth 
in U.S.  Nonfarm Private Business, 1948-79a 
Independent  Equation 
variable  2-1  2-2  2-3 
0.014  0.026  0.016 
(7.78)  (4.97)  (8.09) 
g  0.481  0.799 
(4.84)  (4.09) 
Ag  0.091  0.056  0.120 
(1.61)  (1.05)  (4.31) 
ku,  0.417b  0.143b  0.427 
(4.69)  (0.92)  (5.11) 
j  0.033  0.024  0.028 
(3.52)  (2.38)  (4.77) 
A  W!  0.080  0.089  0.064 
(1.74)  (2.06)  (1.47) 
z  -0.079  -0.068  -0.083 
(-3.25)  (-2.81)  (-3.55) 
p."  -0.037  -0.022  -0.040 
(-1.91)  (-1.10)  (-2.12) 
C*  0.011  0.012  0.010 
(2.64)  (3.17)  (2.67) 
Ip  ...  0.619 
(3.28) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.917  0.983  0.899 
Standard error of estimate  0.005  0.004  0.005 
Durbin-Watson  2.254  2.402  2.142 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  based on data cited in the appendix. 
a.  The dependent  variable in 2-1 is the rate of change of output per total-employee  hour; in 2-2, the rate of change 
of output; and in 2-3, the rate of change  of production-worker  hourly output residualized  on the rate of change of 
capacity utilization. The variable Ip  is rate of change in production-worker hours. Given first differences,  actual years 
of observation  are  1949-79.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  Adjusted to correspond  with the redefinition of the dependent  variable, as described  in the text. 
capital  intensity  to a direct measure  of the rate of change  of the utilized 
capital  stock by removing  labor  hours  from  the denominator.  The R2  is 
naturally higher in 2-2 than in  1-3.54  Otherwise the model is relatively 
insensitive to this change in the form of specification  of the dependent 
variable: the social variables are robust, although  j  falls slightly in 
magnitude  of coefficient  and statistical  significance;  the technical  varia- 
bles are the ones, interestingly, that shift substantially  with this re- 
54. The results  in 2-1 are roughly  consistent  with the assumption  of constant  returns 
to scale implied  in the initial  specification  of equations  4 and  5, for the coefficient  on Ip  is 
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specification,  inasmuch  as the coefficients on g, ku,  and p, all change 
greatly. 
Because many of the variables  included  in the model vary over the 
business cycle, it seems important  to test the sensitivity of our results 
thus far by using a dependent  variable  that is itself cyclically adjusted. 
We computed  such a variable  by first  regressing  q, the rate of change  of 
productivity,  on g, the rate of change of capacity utilization,  and then 
taking  the residual  from that equation  as our measure  of decyclicized 
productivity  growth. We then regressed this measure of residualized 
productivity growth on all variables in equation 8 with the obvious 
exception  of g itself. We report  these results  in equation  2-3.55  Given  the 
possibilities of cyclical covariation among many of the independent 
variables,  the results  are surprisingly  robust.  The  R2 remains  high. Only 
zAg,  the change  in  the  rate  of change  of capacity  utilization,  is dramatically 
affected by moving to the decyclicized dependent variable, with its 
coefficient  increasing  in both magnitude  and significance. 
COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE 
We retain the decyclicized specification  in 2-3 for the purposes of 
comparative tests of the model's explanatory power and structural 
stability.  Table  3 compares  our  results  with  those that  might  be extracted 
from  prevailing  discussions of the productivity  slowdown.  Equation  3-1 
reproduces the model as reported in 2-3. Equation 3-2 estimates the 
simplest  possible technical  model  that  can be derived  from  the available 
mainstream  literature;  it includes zAg  to control  for sluggish  firm  adjust- 
ments to changes in the level of business activity;  k11,  the change in the 
utilized capital-labor  ratio, reflecting  the concern of the mainstream 
55. There  are a variety  of ways of performing  this residualization;  one can work  from 
either  equation  4 or 5, which  have comparable  results. Two features  of the decyclicized 
model in 2-3 are worth noting  in this regard.  First, the fact that the effects of ] remain 
robust  even after  the  dependent  variable  has  been  residualized  on  g suggests  that  its effects 
are not simply  an additional  variable  reflecting  the cycle. Second, we have tested for the 
relative  importance  of the  two  main  components  ofJ in  equation  6:  unemployment  duration 
and relative  income loss. When  we reestimate  2-3 with the rates of change  of those two 
components substituted  for j,  both component variables are statistically significant, 
although  the standardized  regression  coefficient  on the unemployment-duration  compo- 
nent is the larger  of the two. All other results remain  essentially unchanged  with this 
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Table 3.  Alternative Models of Aggregate Productivity Growth in U.S.  Nonfarm Private 
Business, 1948-79a 
Independent  Equation 
variable  3-1  3-2  3-3  3-4 
0.016  0.009  0.011  0.015 
(8.09)  (2.12)  (2.50)  (7.09) 
Ag  0.120  0.048  0.066  0.114 
(4.31)  (0.91)  (1.25)  (3.74) 
kl,  0.427  0.758  0.771  0.469 
(5.11)  (4.57)  (4.50)  (5.39) 
j  0.028  ...  ...  0.028 
(4.77)  (4.72) 
A w!  !  0.064  . .  .  . ..  0.075 
(1.47)  (1.67) 
z  -0.083  ...  ...  -0.076 
(-3.55)  (-2.73) 
P,  -0.040  ...  ...  -0.039 
(-2.12)  (-2.04) 
C*  0.010  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.011 
(2.67)  (2.49) 
Pf  .  .  -0.037  0.028  . . . 
(-1.06)  (0.48) 
Dumtny,967-73  .  .  .  .  .  -0.009  -0.002 
(-1.82)  (-1.04) 
Duxmmy  1974-79  .  .  .  ...  -0.011  0.001 
(-1.21)  (0.25) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.899  0.485  0.512  0.899 
Standard error of estimate  0.005  0.010  0.010  0.005 
Durbin-Watson  2.142  1.517  1.767  2.257 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  based on sources  cited in the appendix. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the logarithmic rate of change in output per production-worker hour residualized on 
the  logarithmic  rate of  change  in capacity  utilization.  The  variable pf denotes  the  rate of  change  in relative  fuel 
prices.  Given  first  differences,  the  actual  years  of  observation  are  1949-79.  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are 
t-statistics. 
literature  with capital intensity and the hypothesis of capital shortage; 
and pr' the measure of relative input prices that seems to reflect the 
hypotheses  of recent  discussions  about  the oil-price  shock most closely. 
We consider elaborations  and extensions of this simple  formulation  of 
the technical  model  in the following  section, with particular  attention  to 
the effects of changes in characteristics  of the labor  force. 
Several conclusions flow from the comparison of  the results in 
equations  3-1  and  3-2. First,  this kind  of "technical"  model  that  excludes 
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(decyclicized) productivity growth nor remains as free of potential 
inefficiency  from autocorrelation  as the more inclusive model reported 
in 3-1. Second, such a technical model generates substantially  higher 
estimates of the impact of variations in utilized capital intensity on 
productivity;  assuming,  on both theoretical  and econometric  grounds, 
that  the social  model  is a more  fully specified  equation,  this suggests  that 
conventional studies have suffered from underspecification  bias and 
have substantially  overestimated  the impact  of slowdowns  in the rate  of 
growth of the capital-labor  ratio. Third,  p, is statistically  insignificant 
even in the more limited technical model and appears  again  as a more 
statistically  imprecise  measure  of effects of external  input  prices. 
There is another  useful way to assess econometrically  the ability  of 
these alternative  models to account for period-specific  declines in the 
rate  of productivity  growth.  As the data  in the display  above report,  the 
rate of growth of output per production-worker  hour slowed by 0.68 
percentage  points from 1948-66 to 1966-73 and by 2.02 points from 
1948-66  to 1973-79.  The corresponding  decrements  for  the decyclicized 
measure  of productivity  growth we use, the dependent  variable  in 3-1 
and  3-2, were 0.69 and 1.76  percentage  points, respectively. We can test 
for the ability of these two models to capture these between-period 
declines by adding dummy variables for the years between 1967 and 
1973 and between 1974 and 1979. If the other independent  variables 
account not only for annual  variations  in productivity  growth  but also 
for average  between-period  declines, the estimated  coefficients  on these 
respective dummy variables should be statistically insignificant  and 
close to zero. If, on the other hand, one or another  of the models could 
account for little of a specific between-period  decline, the estimated 
coefficient on that dummy variable would be close to the values of 
- 0.0069  or - 0.0176  and, presumably,  statistically  significant. 
Equations  3-3 and 3-4 show results  of this test for the two models. In 
3-3, the results for the technical  model, the 1967-73 dummy  variable  is 
statistically significant  at 5 percent and is actually greater than the 
between-period  difference  in productivity  growth  rates; this confirms  a 
familiar  result in conventional studies of the slowdown from 1966 to 
1973-that is, capital  intensity  grew  very rapidly  during  this period, and 
technical factors are unable to account for any of the first phase of 
slower productivity growth between 1966 and 1973. The estimated 
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percent level of significance  and is equal to roughly  three-fifths  of the 
overall  decline in productivity  growth  from 1948-66  to 1974-79, further 
confirming  the recent conclusions of Bosworth and many others that 
slower capital formation  in the 1970s explains relatively little of the 
productivity  slowdown  in those years.56 
Equation  3-4 suggests, in contrast, that the basic social model pre- 
sented in 3-1 can account statistically  for virtually  all between-period 
productivity slowdowns; neither dummy variable reported in 3-4 is 
statistically  significant,  and  both are quite small. 
What factors in that model play the greatest (estimated) role in 
accounting  for the slowdown itself? We can provide direct statistical 
estimates  of the relative  explanatory  power  of the different  constitutent 
variables represented  in equation 8. Relying on the general algebraic 
result,  in matrix notation,  zA^  =  PAX, we  can estimate  the predicted 
change in q between the various phases of the postwar  period that we 
expect to result from the movements in the respective independent 
variables  using  coefficients  calculated  in  the basic  estimation  of equation 
8. We present  this  comparison  in  table  4; there  we account  for  the decline 
in q from the 1948-66 boom years to the 1966-73 phase of slowdown 
and  then again  for the decline in growth  rates  from 1948-66 to 1973-79. 
We make  use of the complete  version of the model reported  in equation 
1-3,  rather  than  the decyclicized version in 2-3, in order  to take account 
of differences  in  the rate  of change  of capacity  utilization  from  the period 
of prosperity  to the successive periods  of slowdown. 
The first and third  columns present the predicted  percentage  points 
of decline in hourly productivity  growth, while the second and fourth 
columns report the percentage of the total predicted decline that is 
attributable  to each of the variables. For explaining  the decline from 
1948-66 to 1973-79 we use the coefficients  reported  in column 1-3. For 
the decline from 1948-66 to 1966-73  we use coefficients  for the compa- 
rable equation estimated from the shorter period from 1948 to 1973. 
Further  to clarify the relative contributions  of different  variables we 
provide subtotals by the major  categories of factors stipulated  in the 
original  presentation  of the social model  of productivity  growth.57 
56. See Bosworth,  "Capital  Formation  and  Economic  Policy." 
57. The procedure  applied  in table  4 would  not be valid  if a significant  number  of the 
variables  incorporated  in the calculations  were statistically  insignificant;  since we are 
relying  only on variables  that  prove  to be statistically  significant  in column  1-3,  our  use of T. Weisskopf,  S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  421 
Table 4.  Accounting for the Productivity Slowdown, Selected Periods,  1948-79a 
Attribution  of decline in productivity  growth 
1948-66 to 1966-73  1948-66 to 1973-79 
Percentage  Share of  Percentage  Share of 
points of  the decline  points of  the decline 
Variable  decline in q  (percent)  decline in q  (percent) 
g, Ag  0.13  23  0.34  16 
ku  -0.12  -21  0.53  25 
e, z, Aw!  0.57  98  0.60  28 
P.,  0.07  12  0.35  16 
C*  -0.07  -  12  0.32  15 
Total predicted  decline  0.58  100.0  2.14  100.0 
Actual  decline  0.68  . . .  2.02  . . . 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Percentage  points  of predicted  decline  in productivity  growth,  q,  are calculated  by multiplying the regression 
coefficients  from the basic  model  of equation 8 by the decline  in the average  values  for the respective  independent 
variables for two periods  being compared in the two parts of the table. The comparison  of the decline  from 1948-66 
to  1973-79  is based  on the coefficients  reported in equation  1-3. The comparison  between  1948-66  and  1%6-73  is 
based  on the comparable  coefficients  estimated  for the period from  1948 to  1973. 
Table  4 shows once again  that  the estimated  social model  can account 
for essentially all the actual  decline in q in each of the two critical  phases 
of the slowdown. We conclude, as much as one can rely on statistical 
estimations  of this sort, that the social model of aggregate  productivity 
growth  has "solved the puzzle" of the productivity  slowdown. 
In the first  phase of decline the movements  of capacity  utilization  and 
capital intensity, the core variables  in traditional  analyses of aggregate 
productivity  growth, are unable to account for any of the slowdown in 
productivity  growth, and both variables  predict a decline of only 0.01 
percentage points in productivity  growth between 1948-66 and 1966- 
73; this is due to the significant  increase  in the growth  rate  of the utilized 
capital-labor  ratio in 1966-73. Among the variables  introduced  in this 
discussion of the social dimensions of productivity, those measuring 
changes  in factors affecting  work  intensity  account  for by far the largest 
unadjusted  regression  coefficients  is appropriate.  We  calculate  the proportionate  influence 
of our vector of explanatory  variables  as a percentage  of total predicted  decline, rather 
than  actual  decline,  to maintain  internal  consistency  within  the calculations. 
The results reported  in equation  1-3 of table 1 and in table 4 differ  slightly  from the 
results  reported  in chap. 6 and app. C of our book, Beyond  the Waste  Land. The results 
reported here supersede those in our book, since they are based on an improved 
specification  of the  basic  model  and  some  data  revisions  that  we were  unable  to incorporate 
into  the versions  reported  in our  book. 422  Brookinigs Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
share of the first period of slowdown, more than 98 percent of the 
predicted decline. This lends credence statistically to what we have 
already  suggested  historically-that work  intensity  declined  rapidly  after 
1966  and  that  corporations  were not capable  of restoring  work  intensity 
in the years before 1973.58 
The second phase of decline suggests  a pattern  that  is quite  different, 
one with each of the five categories of variables accounting for a 
significant  portion  of the total predicted  decline; the variables  affecting 
work intensity remain  the most important  in accounting  for the slow- 
down.  59 
One final  test of the statistical  properties  of the basic social model is 
in some ways the most demanding  and the most important. Many 
mainstream  analyses of the productivity  slowdown conclude that its 
mysteries  result  from  exogenous structural  changes  distorting  the econ- 
omy's  normal  mechanisms  generating  steady  expansion.  This  conclusion 
implies  that models explaining  productivity  growth  would be incapable 
of accounting endogenously for the productivity  slowdown and that 
recourse to external  factors would be necessary to explain changes in 
the performance  of the economy, particularly  after 1973. 
Our  historical  analysis leads us to an opposite conclusion. We argue 
that  the structural  forces that  provided  the basis for postwar  prosperity 
also led to the stagnation  of the late 1960s  and 1970s;  that  is, the structure 
of postwar  prosperity  itself eventually  generated  declining  productivity 
growth. 
This  conclusion  can be tested through  an  ex post forecasting  exercise. 
If we are correct in our hypotheses about structural  stability,  the social 
model, as estimated  in either its basic or decyclicized versions, should 
do as  well in explaining productivity growth during the period of 
prosperity  as it does during  the two periods of slowdown. More perti- 
nently, it should  be possible to explain  the productivity  slowdowns  after 
1966  and 1973  by means  of an  ex post forecast  with  structural  coefficients 
estimated  for the years leading  up to 1966  and 1973,  respectively. 
Tables 5 and 6 and the following paragraphs  present the results of 
58.  See Bowles,  Gordon, and Weisskopf, Beyond the Waste Land, chaps. 4-5. 
59. Ibid. We provide  there an additional  argument  about  the feedback  of policies to 
restore work intensity on declining  capacity utilization  and slower growth in capital 
intensity;  we call it the "cold bath effect" and present some econometric  evidence for 
those connections  in appendix  C of the book. T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordoni  423 
Table 5.  Structural Stability Tests, Selected Periods,  1948-79a 
Social  model  Technzical  model 
Independent  1948-79  1948-73  1948-66  1948-79  1948-73  1948-66 
variable  3-1  5-1  5-2  3-2  5-3  5-4 
0.016  0.015  0.017  0.009  0.014  0.017 
(8.09)  (5.62)  (5.56)  (2.12)  (2.97)  (2.96) 
Ag  0.120  0.114  0.038  0.048  0.022  0.009 
(4.31)  (2.90)  (0.69)  (0.91)  (0.39)  (0.14) 
k,,  0.427  0.440  0.439  0.758  0.543  0.519 
(5.11)  (4.24)  (3.56)  (4.57)  (2.91)  (2.17) 
j  0.028  0.027  0.039  .  .  ..  .  ... 
(4.77)  (4.15)  (5.63) 
A  II,!  0.064  0.054  0.117  . .  .  . ..  ... 
(1.47)  (1.10)  (2.07) 
z  -0.083  -0.103  -0.033  . .  .  . ..  ... 
(-3.55)  (-2.73)  (-0.71) 
pX  -0.040  -0.018  -0.018  . ..  ...  . 
(-2.12)  (-0.47)  (-0.35) 
C*  0.010  0.013  0.008  . .  .  . ..  ... 
(2.67)  (1.98)  (1.21) 
pf  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.037  -0.031  -0.003 
(-1.06)  (-0.51)  (-0.03) 
Summary statistic 
K2  0.899  0.799  0.812  0.485  0.203  0.120 
Standard error 
of estimate  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.010  0.010  0.010 
Durbin-Watson  2.142  2.188  2.367  1.517  1.802  2.027 
Source:  Authors' estimates  based on data cited  in the appendix. 
a.  The  social  model  and  the  technical  model  are estimated  based  on  three  suLccessive periods  reprodLcing the 
model  structure from  3-1 and 3-2,  respectively.  The  dependent  variable is  q*,  the decyclicized  rate of  growth  of 
hourly output. The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
such an exercise. As in the analysis of comparative  explanatory  power 
above, we use the decyclicized model, denoting the decyclicized de- 
pendent variable as  q*,  and present evidence comparing both the 
structural  stability  and forecasting  performance  of the social and tech- 
nical  models represented  by 3-1 and 3-2. 
Columns  5-1 and 5-2 present the results of estimation  of the social 
model  for two different  periods  of estimation:  first  for the longer  period 
from 1948  to 1973  and then for the more demanding  and shorter  period 
from 1948  to 1966. (The first column reproduces  the coefficients from 
3-1 of table 3 for ease of comparison.) Particularly  for the period of 
estimation  from 1948  to 1973,  but even for the shorter  period  from 1948 
to 1966, the results suggest substantial  comparability  between the full 424  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
Table 6.  Ex Post Forecasts of Aggregate Productivity Growth, Selected Periods, 
1967-79 a 
Social model  Technical  model 
Independent  1974-79  1967-79  1974-79  1967-79 
variable  6-1  6-2  6-3  6-4 
Constant  0.0002  0.007  0.012  0.019 
(0.13)  (3.02)  (9.61)  (11.83) 
q*  0.841  0.857  0.314  0.371 
(10.21)  (8.11)  (5.33)  (5.25) 
Summary statistic 
R?_  2  0.954  0.844  0.846  0.689 
Standard error of estimate  0.004  0.006  0.003  0.004 
Durbin-Watson  1.272  1.778  1.541  1.171 
Source:  Authors' estimates  based on data cited in the appendix. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  predicted  q*,  the out-of-sample  forecast  for equations  from columns  5-1 and 5-2, 
5-3 and 5-4, respectively.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
and shorter periods of estimation. The signs and magnitudes  of the 
coefficients  are quite close and the regression  statistics  are also similar. 
Three variables,  z, p., and C*, have small  and insignificant  coefficients 
for the shortest  period,  but  these variables  themselves  display  relatively 
little variation  during  the period  of prosperity.60  The fact that  this model 
still  explains  81 percent  of the variation  in productivity  growth,  adjusted 
for degrees of freedom, without  taking  into account information  about 
the periods of slowdown after 1966  and 1973  suggests that the model's 
explanatory  power is not dependent  on specific  or exogenous postpros- 
perity developments.61 
Columns  3-2, 5-3, and  5-4  present  parallel  data  for  the  technical  model. 
That  model fares less well when estimated  for the shorter  periods, with 
60. It is also interesting  to note that  bothj and  Aw!  are  highly  significant  in the estima- 
tion  for 1949-66,  lending  support  to the analysis  developed  in  Beyond  the Waste  Land  that 
rapid  productivity  growth  in the postwar  boom depended  heavily  on the stimulus  effects 
of a rising  cost of  job loss and  the incentive  effects of rapid  growth  in workers'  take-home 
pay. 
61. It is possible  to conduct  more  formal  statistical  tests for the structural  stability  of 
the  equations  by conducting  a Chow  test  for  the  equality  of the  coefficients  of the estimated 
equations  for the respective  periods  of estimation.  Two pair-wise  tests are  possible: 1948- 
66 versus 1966-79;  and 1948-73  versus 1973-79.  The latter  is inappropriate  for the social 
model  because  there  are  insufficient  degrees  of freedom  to estimate  the  full  equation  during 
the 1973-79  period.  For the former  case, the relevant  F-statistic  falls substantially  below 
the  critical  value  (at  5  percent)  for  that  comparison,  allowing  us to accept  the  null  hypothesis 
of equivalent  coefficients. T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  425 
a significant  drop  in  its adjusted  coefficient  of determination  and  a notable 
decline in the estimated  magnitude  of the coefficient  for k,.62 
Below we  use the respective period-of-estimation  coefficients to 
generate  average  annual  predicted  rates  of productivity  growth  for 1966- 
79 and 1973-79 and compare them with the actual average rates of 
change  in the decyclicized dependent  variable  for those years. With  the 
Average annual rate 
of productivity 
growth (percent)63 
1973-79  1966-79 
Actual  q*  1.036  1.669 
Social  model,  q*  0.894  2.164 
Technical  model,  q*  1.526  2.546 
1948-73 estimation,  for example, the social model  forecasts an average 
annual  predicted  rate  of productivity  growth  for 1973-79  of 0.89  percent, 
which is very close to the actual  rate;  the technical  model generates  an 
average  annual  predicted  rate  of 1.53  percent,  roughly  50 percent  higher 
than the actual rate. Although  the predictions  from our forecasts, not 
surprisingly,  are less accurate  based on the shorter 1948-66 period of 
estimation,  the social model nonetheless outperforms  the more limited 
technical  model by a comparable  margin. 
The above results  for average  forecast  performance  ignore  the close- 
ness of fit from year to year. Table 6 provides the basis for the latter 
comparison  by regressing  out-of-sample  predicted  values for q* from 
the appropriate  equations  in table 5 against  the actual  values for q* for 
1974-79 and 1967-79, respectively. A perfect forecast performance, 
obviously, would result in an estimated regression  coefficient of 1.00 
and  an R2  of 1.00. 
62. The coefficient on the k,, variable in the equations for 1949-73 and 1949-66 
equations  5-3 and 5-4 falls to a value close to its stable  levels in the estimations  with the 
social model, suggesting  that  its higher  estimated  values  in the 1949-79  estimations  of the 
technical  model  are due to the artificially  high  weight  placed  on declining  rates  of capital 
formation  in 1974-79  in the underspecified  technical  model;  it attributes  to declining  rates 
of growth  of capital  intensity  some  of what  is explained  by the social  variables  in our  more 
inclusive  social  model. 
63. The  predicted  values  forq*  are  calculated  with  the  period-of-estimation  coefficients 
from  equations  5-2  and  5-4  for the 1966-79  estimates  and  from  5-1  and  5-3  for the 1973-79 
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Equations 6-1 and 6-2 report these forecast results for the social 
model, providing  substantial  support  for our conclusions of structural 
stability.  The forecast  for 1974-79, based on coefficients  for 1948-73, is 
particularly  successful: the estimated  coefficient  is 0.841;  the  R2 is 0.95; 
and  we reject,  by the appropriate  test [t = (  -  1.00)Af)],  the alternative 
hypothesis that  a  is statistically different  from 1.00 at the 95 percent 
confidence  level. The forecast  results  for 1967-79,  based  on coefficients 
estimated  for 1948-66, are only slightly  less impressive,  with a compa- 
rable  value for  and the R2  almost  as large. 
Subjected  to the same tests, the technical model exhibits less suc- 
cessful forecasting characteristics:  the estimated magnitudes of the 
regression  coefficients  are substantially  lower;  the adjusted  coefficients 
of determination  are also lower;  and the forecast performance  depends 
much  more  on the constant  term  than  in the case of the social model. 
It appears, in short, that the social model provides a robust and 
comprehensive statistical explanation of the slowdown in aggregate 
productivity  growth  in the U.S. economy after 1966. 
Extensions and Competing Hypotheses 
However successful, the basic social model developed and tested in 
the two preceding sections represents a very provisional effort to 
encompass some social determinants  of aggregate  productivity  growth 
that have been ignored in mainstream  analyses. We explore in this 
section alternative  hypotheses advanced  in the productivity  literature. 
We show that this basic model remains robust in the sense that its 
explanatory  power is not undercut  when confronted  with alternative  (or 
competing)  explanations. 
We follow a standard  procedure  throughout  this section: after speci- 
fying  a string  of additional  variables  identified  by alternative  hypotheses, 
we first consider the effects of adding  those variables  to the technical 
model, with the decyclicized dependent  variable  as reported  in 3-2, and 
then look at the effects of adding  them to the apparently  more  complete 
social model as reported  in 3-1. Any of the additional  variables  whose 
sign is consistent with theoretical  expectations  and whose inclusion  in 
the more complete social model is warranted  on econometric  grounds 
will then be carried  over to a round of estimation after each of these T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  427 
separate  tests. As before, we introduce  variables  in the text as levels for 
ease of exposition and then translate  them into rates of change  for the 
purposes  of econometric  estimation.M4 
LABOR  FORCE  COMPOSITION  AND  QUALITY 
Some  have  attributed  a significant  portion  of the  decline  in  productivity 
growth  rates to changes in composition  of the labor  force and declining 
"quality"  of the employed  population.  Although  several  dimensions  of 
this  possible  effect have been explored,  most  analysts  have  concentrated 
on the ostensible impact  on quality  of the rising  proportion  in the labor 
force of women and younger  workers.65 
A problem with most of these studies, however, is that they have 
axiomatically  applied the marginal  productivity  theory of wages. De- 
mographically  adjusted  indexes of labor  input  are derived  by assuming 
that the relative productivity,  or labor "quality," of different  age-sex 
labor  force groupings  is captured  by the relative  wages. We are skeptical 
about both the validity of and the necessity for the use of wages as 
proxies for productivity.A1  Hypotheses about the effects of changing 
labor force composition on productivity can and should be  tested 
directly,  not presumed.  We consider  here three main  hypotheses about 
how education,  age composition,  and sex composition  affect labor  force 
quality. 
As Denison and  others have noted, the educational  attainment  of the 
labor  force has risen fairly steadily over the entire postwar period, so 
64. We require  that a variable  at least increase  the adjusted  coefficient  of multiple 
determination  in the social model,  with  the correct  sign,  for inclusion  in the final  round  of 
estimation.  This criterion  is properly  applied  only when inclusion  or exclusion of the 
variable  involved does not otherwise substantially  affect the coefficients  on the other 
independent  variables.  For one useful discussion of this problem  of specification,  see 
Potluri  Rao and Roger LeRoy Miller, Applied Econometrics  (Wadsworth,  1971), pp. 
35-38. 
65. For two of the most systematic  discussions  of these effects, see George  L. Perry, 
"Labor  Force Structure,  Potential  Output,  and Productivity,"  BPEA, 3:1971,  pp. 533- 
65; and Jeffrey  M. Perloff  and Michael L. Wachter,  "The Productivity  Slowdown:  A 
Labor Problem?" in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,  The  Decline in Productivity Growth, 
pp. 115-42. 
66. For a useful recent summary  of problems  with interpreting  demographic  wage 
differentials  as indicators  of differences  in productivity,  particularly  by race and by sex, 
see Donald  J. Treiman  and Heidi I. Hartmann,  eds., Women,  Work,  and Wages:  Equal 
Pay for Jobs of Equal Value (National Academy Press,  1981), chaps. 2-3. 428  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
that  variations  in its movements  are  unlikely  to account  for variations  in 
the growth  of aggregate  productivity.67  But this presumption  should  be 
tested like any other. We can measure changes in the educational 
"quality" of the labor force at least approximately  by a variable  mea- 
suring  changes in the median  educational  attainment  of the labor  force; 
this variable  is denoted v. 
Equation  7-1 in table 7 reports  on the addition  of v to the technical 
model. Its coefficient is significant  and positive, as expected. When 
added  to the social model in equation  7-2, however, the coefficient  falls 
to one-third  its level in 7-1  and  is no longer  significant  even at 10  percent. 
Since its inclusion  nonetheless  slightly  raises  the adjusted  R2, it becomes 
a candidate  for inclusion  in the final  round  of estimation. 
It is also possible to test directly for the effects of the age and sex 
composition  of the labor  force. Some  have  argued  that  relatively  younger 
workers  have  lowered  the  average  experience  of the  labor  force, reducing 
the  general  skill  levels of the  employed  and  thereby  retarding  productivity 
growth. We test this effect by adding  a variable  for labor  force inexpe- 
rience,  which  we express  as  Ly, the percentage  of the labor  force  between 
sixteen and twenty-four  years old; this measure  of "inexperience"  rose 
significantly  after  the early 1960s.  Others  have argued  a similar  hypoth- 
esis about  the share  of women in the labor  force, assuming  that women 
have relatively  lower skills than men and that their  rising  share of total 
employment has similarly  retarded  productivity  growth. We test this 
hypothesis by including  a variable  for the female-employment  share, 
which  we express as Lf, the percentage  of total nonfarm  private  employ- 
ment  that  is female. 
In equations 7-3 and 7-4 we report  the results of adding  these two 
variables to the technical model. The proxy for inexperience, ly, is 
insignificant,  while If  has the correct sign and is statistically  significant. 
When  each variable  is added  to the social model  in 7-5 and  7-6, however, 
neither  is significant  and  each reduces  the adjusted  R2. 
To check  for  potential  complementarities  among  these  three  measures 
of labor force characteristics,  we include all of them in the final two 
columns of table 7. The results of their inclusion remain consistent: 
when added to the technical model, both the proxy for education  and 
the female-employment  share  have the correct  signs  and  are significant. 
When added to  the  social model in 7-8, neither the variables for 
67. See Edward  F. Denison,  "Explanations  of  Declining  Productivity  Growth,"  Survey 
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Table 7.  Productivity Growth and Labor Supply Characteristics, 1948-79a 
Independent 
variable  7-1  7-2  7-3  7-4  7-5  7-6  7-7  7-8 
0.004  0.013  0.009  0.013  0.016  0.016  0.007  0.013 
(0.92)  (4.94)  (2.09)  (2.91)  (7.89)  (7.41)  (1.32)  (4.00) 
Ag  0.083  0.104  0.051  0.014  0.119  0.118  0.052  0.100 
(1.61)  (3.46)  (0.94)  (0.27)  (4.19)  (3.89)  (1.00)  (3.03) 
kl,  0.753  0.450  0.762  0.844  0.427  0.434  0.817  0.465 
(4.88)  (5.34)  (4.51)  (5.18)  (5.00)  (4.60)  (5.29)  (4.79) 
j  ...  0.029  ...  ...  0.028  0.028  ...  0.028 
(4.99)  (4.46)  (4.59)  (4.43) 
Aw!  .  .  .  0.095  ...  ...  0.064  0.062  ...  0.099 
(1.93)  (1.43)  (1.37)  (1.88) 
z  ...  -0.053  ...  ...  -0.083  ;0.082  ...  -0.050 
(-1.64)  (-3.28)  (-  3.40)  (-1.48) 
pf or p,  -  0.003  -0.033  -  0.035  -0.036  -0.40  -0.040  -  0.002  -0.034 
(-0.09)  (-1.72)  (-0.97)  (-1.07)  (-  2.05)  (-  2.08)  (-0.44)  (-1.67) 
C*  ...  0.010  ...  ...  0.010  0.010  ...  0.008 
(2.92)  (2.13)  (2.32)  (1.45) 
v  0.730  0.301  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.849  0.386 
(2.27)  (1.28)  (2.25)  (1.39) 
lY  ...  -...  0.021  ...  -0.001  ...  0.051  0.029 
(-0.33)  (-0.02)  (0.76)  (0.65) 
if  ...  ...  ..  .  -0.526  ...  -  0.026  -0.447  -0.023 
(-2.01)  (-0.18)  (-1.78)  (-0.16) 
Summary statistic 
T2  0.554  0.902  0.467  0.537  0.894  0.894  0.592  0.894 
Standard error 
of estimate  0.010  0.005  0.011  0.010  0.005  0.005  0.009  0.005 
Durbin-Watson  1.647  2.090  1.526  1.609  2.143  2.149  1.794  2.083 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  based on data cited in the appendix. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the decyclicized  rate of change of hourly output, q*. The variable v is rate of change 
in the educational  attainment of the labor force; I(, the rate of change in the labor force aged sixteen  to twenty-four; 
and If, the rate of change in the female share of employment.  Given first differences,  actual years of observation  are 
1949-79.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics.  The input-price variable is entered as pf in the technical  model 
and Px in the social  model. 
inexperience nor for female-employment  share is significant  while the 
proxy for education is now significant  at 10 percent. Based on these 
results, we carry  over v for use in final  estimation.68 
ADDITIONAL  FACTORS OF  PRODUCTION 
Some analysts  have focused on the effects on productivity  growth  of 
additional  factors of production,  exploring  the impact of variations  in 
68. These results confirm  our concern about the possible biases in conventional 
accounting-method  studies  of the productivity  slowdown.  See note  46  and  the correspond- 
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energy consumption, supervisory  inputs, or both. Theory might lead 
one to expect that productivity  would be positively related  to the ratio 
of energy consumption  to production-worker  hours  and also positively 
related to the ratio of nonproduction  (or supervisory)  employment  to 
production-worker  employment, particularly  with our definition  of a 
dependent variable as output per production-worker  hour. We have 
tested these two hypotheses about additional  "factors" of production 
by adding  variables  to our  basic model  measuring  X, the ratio  of physical 
energy  units (in Btu units consumed  by industry)  to production-worker 
hours; and S, the intensity of supervision as defined above. Neither 
variable  is statistically  significant  in either specification.  Given that we 
had  already  taken into account the relative  price of external  inputs,  p., 
it is not surprising  that adding  a measure  of the energy-labor  ratio did 
not improve  the explanatory  power  of our  model. But even in a separate 
equation  from which  p, was excluded, x was not significant.  And given 
what we have already  observed in column 1-2, it is also not surprising 
that  the addition  of a measure  of the intensity  of supervision  as a direct 
factor  of production  did not affect the results. 
SECTORAL  COMPOSITION  AND  MARKET  GROWTH 
Some analysts  have paid  particular  attention  to the effects of product 
market composition and market scale.  It is possible to  test  these 
additional  hypotheses also. 
One common  theory in both the popular  and  the analytic  literature  is 
that of "deindustrialization."69  This theory suggests that at least some 
of the slowdown in productivity  growth since the 1960s has resulted 
from the shift in output, away from manufacturing  and other goods- 
producing  sectors in which  productivity  levels and  rates  of growth  have 
69. See, for example,  Barry  Bluestone  and  Bennett  Harrison,  The  Deindustrialization 
of America (Basic Books,  1982); Lester C.  Thurow, "The Productivity  Problem" 
(Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology,  Department  of Economics,  November  1980);  and 
Gregory  B. Christainsen  and Robert  H. Haveman,  "The Determinants  of the Decline in 
Measured  Productivity  Growth:  An Evaluation,"  in Joint  Economic  Committee,  Produc- 
tivity:  The  Foundation  of Growth,  Special  Study  on Economic  Change,  vol. 10,  96 Cong. 
2 sess. (GPO, 1980),  pp. 1-17. We note that Bluestone  and Harrison,  despite their  title, 
focus more on changing  investment  policies and what they call the "hypermobility  of 
capital"  than  the direct  effects of shifts  in employment  or output  out of manufacturing. T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  431 
historically  been relatively  high  and  technical  change  is likely to have its 
biggest impact, into service sectors in which productivity  levels and 
growth  rates  have been relatively  low. 
If the deindustrialization  hypothesis  is correct,  we should  expect that 
aggregate  productivity growth would vary directly with the rate of 
change  in  L,n  ,defined  as the portion  of total  nonfarm  private  employment 
in the (one-digit)  manufacturing  sector.70 
Equations  8  -1 and  8  -2 of table  8 report  the results  of this test. Equation 
8-1 shows that the manufacturing-share  variable is significant when 
added  to the technical model but has the wrong  sign. When it is added 
to the more complete social model, it still has the wrong sign but is 
statistically insignificant.  We conclude that this measure of sectoral 
composition  does not help account  for variations  in productivity  growth 
and  should  not be carried  forward  for further  analysis.71 
A complementary  variant on the sectoral composition theme has 
emerged  from recent Marxian  discussions of the process of accumula- 
tion. Some Marxists define certain sectors as nonproductive  because 
their  workers  do not create  value, in the Marxian  value-theoretic  sense, 
but simply serve the functions of distributing  commodities  or realizing 
surplus  value. If there were a significant  shift of employment  into these 
nonproductive  sectors, according  to this hypothesis, one might  reason- 
ably  expect a retardation  in the rate  of growth  of aggregate  productivity. 
We  can test this hypothesis  in the same  way as we have already  explored 
the deindustrialization  hypothesis. We define  L,, as the portion  of total 
nonfarm  private  employment  in  the  one-digit  sectors  of trade  and  finance, 
insurance,  and  real  estate. Adding  this  variable  to the respective  models, 
70. This variable  could alternatively  have been defined  in terms  of the proportion  of 
employment  in the goods-producing  sector,  but  we chose manufacturing  for  a more  liberal 
test of the effects of sectoral  shifts  because the growth  of productivity  held up longer  in 
manufacturing-through  1973-than in any  other  major  sector. 
For an additional  review  of the effects of changes  in sectoral  composition,  see Martin 
Neil Baily, "The Productivity  Growth Slowdown by Industry," BPEA, 2:1982, pp. 
423-54. 
71. The  reason  it has  the wrong  sign  and  is so significant  in the  technical  model  appears 
to reflect  the  fact  that  the  manufacturing  share  increased  during  1966-73  while  productivity 
growth  declined;  because  the technical  model  cannot  account  for the productivity  decline 
during  that period, it appears statistically  in 8-1 that a rising manufacturing  share is 
associated with slower productivity  growth, a result that disappears  once our social 
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Table 8.  Sectoral Composition and Market Growth,  1948-79a 
Independent 
variable  8-1  8-2  8-3  8-4  8-5  8-6 
0.019  0.016  0.030  0.019  0.025  0.017 
(6.25)  (7.46)  (5.23)  (4.54)  (3.46)  (4.46) 
Ag  0.165  0.136  0.118  0.122  0.062  0.120 
(4.38)  (3.28)  (2.72)  (4.37)  (1.30)  (4.27) 
ku,  0.404  0.414  0.426  0.395  0.812  0.442 
(3.44)  (4.70)  (2.89)  (4.36)  (5.35)  (4.77) 
j  . ...  0.023  ...  0.024  ...  0.027 
(2.24)  (3.49)  (4.01) 
Aw!  . .  .  0.058  . .  .  0.075  ...  0.068 
(1.26)  (1.66)  (1.49) 
z  .  .  0.083  .  ..  -0.075  . ..  -0.083 
(-3.52)  (-2.28)  (-3.49) 
pf orp  -  0.072  -0.037  -0.034  -0.040  -0.037  -0.037 
(-3.19)  (-1.84)  (-1.26)  (-2.01)  (-1.16)  (-1.75) 
C*  .  .  .  0.010  ..  .  0.009  .  .  .  0.011 
(2.63)  (2.35)  (2.64) 
-0.217  -0.027  ...  ...  ... 
(-6.51)  (-0.54) 
In  .  .  .  .  .  -.  0.553  -0.109  ...  ... 
(-4.46)  (-0.93) 
Ytr  .  .  .  .  ..  .  ..  -0.418  -0.040 
(-2.62)  (-0.40) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.797  0.896  0.843  0.898  0.577  0.895 
Standard error 
of estimate  0.007  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.009  0.005 
Durbin-Watson  1.903  2.179  1.976  2.270  1.663  2.275 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  based on data cited  in the appendix. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is  the decyclicized  rate of change  of hourly output,  q*. The variable Im is the rate of 
change  in the  manufacturing share of unemployment;  In, the rate of change  in the nonproduction  sector's  share of 
unemployment;  and Ytr,  the trend rate of change  in real manufacturing output.  Given first differences,  actual years 
of observation  are 1949-79.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics.  The input-price variable is entered as pf in 
the technical  model and Px in the social  model. 
we would expect its coefficient to have a negative sign if the nonpro- 
ductive-sector  hypothesis  is valid.72 
Equations  8-3 and 8-4 report  the results of this test. As was shown 
for the manufacturing  variable,  this composition  measure  is significant 
72. For  a discussion  of this  possible  effect, see Anwar  Shaikh,  "Towards  a Critique  of 
Keynesian  Theory  on the  Role  of the State"  (New School  for  Social  Research,  Department 
of Economics,  September  1980).  To refer  to these sectors as nonproductive  sectors does 
not imply,  of course, that  the efficiency  of production  in those sectors-that is, value of 
the output  per labor  hour  purchased-is irrelevant  or constant  through  time. Growth  of 
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when added  to the technical  model but insignificant  when added to the 
more complete social model. (In this case, at least, the variable  has the 
right  sign.) We choose not to carry  forward  this variable. 
A third  hypothesis  about sectoral  composition  and market  scale has 
been more widely discussed in the British  and European  literature  than 
it has in the United States. This hypothesis is most commonly  labeled 
Verdoorn's law or Kaldor's law. Although originally and typically 
applied to cross-sectional comparisons  of productivity  growth within 
manufacturing,  the Verdoorn  hypothesis may be at least provisionally 
and  inferentially  applied  to variations  in  productivity  growth  over  time.73 
According to the implicit logic of this hypothesis, rapid growth in 
market  scale, resulting  in rapid  growth  in marketed  output, is likely to 
result  in rapid  growth  in  productivity  for  either  (or  both)  of two important 
reasons. First, particularly  in earlier stages of the development of 
domestic markets, rapid  growth in effective demand  is likely to make 
possible  important  economies  of scale  in  the organization  and  production 
of industrial  output.  (The  literature  focuses primarily  on industrial  output 
because that sector is thought  to correspond  most closely to traditional 
hypotheses  of Adam  Smith  about  the efficiency  effects of a finer  technical 
division of labor.) Second, even at later stages of development, rapid 
and sustained  growth  in output  is likely to permit  and encourage  large- 
scale and long-period  innovations  in the technique  and organization  of 
industrial  production, at least in part as a result of declining worker 
resistance  to technological  change.  Once  these increases  in productivity 
growth are realized, of course, they are likely to result in further 
expansions  in the scale of output within  a particular  economy through 
further  extension  of the scale  of the  domestic  market,  through  expansions 
of exports as a result of increasing  international  competitiveness, or 
through  both. This anticipation  of positive feedback on the scale of 
73. There is a scattered  literature  on "Verdoorn's  law." For a sampling,  see the 
seminal  piece  by Nicholas  Kaldor,  originally  written  in 1966,  "Causes  of the Slow Rate  of 
Economic  Growth  in the United Kingdom,"  in Kaldor, Further  Essays on Economic 
Theory  (Holmes  and  Meier, 1978),  pp. 100-38;  John  Cornwall,  "Diffusion,  Convergence, 
and Kaldor's  Laws," Economic  Journal, vol. 86 (June 1976), pp. 307-14; A. Parikh, 
"Differences  in Growth  Rates  and  Kaldor's  Laws," Economica,  vol. 45 (February  1978), 
pp. 83-91; R. E. Rowthorn,  "A Note on Verdoorn's  Law," Economic  Journal, vol. 89 
(March 1979), pp.  131-33; and Robert Boyer and Pascal Petit, "Employment  and 
Productivity in the EEC,"  Cambridge Journal of Economics,  vol.  5 (March 1981), pp. 
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output leads to models of "cumulative causation" in the Verdoorn 
literature.  The policy implication  is clear: "The  central  growth  problem 
in a capitalist  economy," Michael  J. Piore  concludes, "becomes that  of 
how to organize  demand  so that the required  expansion  is assured."74 
One simple  test of the Verdoorn  hypothesis  is possible and  consistent 
at least with the spirit of the available literature:  productivity  growth 
over time should depend, other things being equal, on past long-term 
trends  in industrial  output.  The more  rapid  the cumulative  expansion  of 
industrial  output in the recent past-and  therefore  the more rapid  the 
recent expansion of market  scale-the  more rapid  will be the current 
increases in labor  productivity.  We follow the applied  Verdoorn  litera- 
ture in defining  a variable  to test this hypothesis, tracing  the growth  of 
industrial  output  over a ten-year  time horizon, and capturing  its cumu- 
lative effects through  a ten-year end-of-period  moving average.75  We 
thus define 
Ytr  = [(>  Y,i,)/10], 
where s is 0, .  .  , 9, and  y., is the annual  rate  of growth  of real industrial 
output. 
Equations  8- 5 and 8  -6 report  these results. Again, as was shown for 
the manufacturing  variable, and probably  for the same reasons, the 
variable  is statistically  significant  but with the wrong sign when added 
to the technical  model. It is statistically  insignificant  if added  to the social 
model.76 
CAPITAL  SERVICES 
We noted in our original discussion of capital intensity that the 
productivity  of the utilized capital stock will depend on the degree of 
74. Michael  J. Piore, "The Theory  of Macro-Economic  Regulation  and the Current 
Economic  Crisis  in  the United  States," Working  Paper  285  (MIT,  Department  of Econom- 
ics, July 1981),  p. 20. 
75. The formulation  of the ten-year  moving  average  follows the example  of Vladimir 
Brailovsky,  "Industrialization  and Oil in Mexico:  A Long-Term  Perspective"  (Ministry 
of Industrial  and Natural  Resources, Mexico, September  1980).  We are grateful  to John 
Eatwell  and  Tom  Michl  for useful  conversations  about  the time-series  applications  of the 
Verdoorn's  law analysis. 
76. The fact that the trend-output  variable  is not significant  does not fully vitiate  the 
trend-growth  analysis.  We  note  that  our  own  analysis  of the  Schumpeter  effect  is somewhat T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  435 
nonobsolescence  of the available  capital  stock. We introduce  here some 
alternative  tests for this effect. 
One is to equate obsolescence with the age of the capital stock, 
postulating  that  a relatively  older  capital  stock, other  things  being  equal, 
will provide relatively fewer productive  capital services. (This would 
presume  a lag  in  the adaptation  of the  market  valuation  of capital  goods  .)77 
A second, more  complicated  test follows an idea proposed  by Martin 
Neil Baily.78  He argues  that  the  relative  efficiency  of the current  available 
capital  stock  will  depend  substantially  on the  extent  of past  unanticipated 
price changes in the relative price of inputs complementary  to capital 
services, and particularly  in the relative price of energy inputs. If 
complementary  input prices remain  predictable,  conforming  to expec- 
tations at the time of the original  purchase  of the capital stock, then a 
relatively  large  fraction  of the current  available  capital  stock will remain 
nonobsolescent.  If, in contrast,  there  has been a sharp  upturn  in relative 
energy costs since the original  purchases  of the current  capital stock, 
Baily concludes, "energy-inefficient  vintages of capital  will be utilized 
less intensively  and  scrapped  earlier  following  a rise in energy  prices.  "79 
We looked  at two alternative  versions of this hypothesis,  and  the results 
are  reported  in the note below.80 
We can explore the hypothesis  through  one further  test. Particularly 
as highlighted  by Baily, energy-price  shocks are viewed as reducing  the 
analogous;  ours  has the advantage,  we think,  of focusing  more  directly  on factors  related 
to innovation  and  avoiding  confusion  between  the rate  of growth  of the economy  itself, on 
the one hand,  and  changes  in the pace of innovation  or the technical  division  of labor. 
77. For this version  we directly  measured  the relative  age of the capital  stock, Ka, as 
the average  age of industrial  equipment  expressed  as a deviation  around  its mean  for the 
period  of observation  from  1948  to 1979.  When  this  variable,  expressed  as a rate  of change, 
is added  to equation  3-2, it has the expected  sign  and  is statistically  significant.  When  it is 
added  to the social  model,  it becomes  insignificant. 
78. See Baily, "Productivity  and  the Services  of Capital  and  Labor." 
79. Ibid., p. 20. 
80. We begin  with  the proposition  that  the utilized,  nonobsolescent  capital  stock may 
be defined  as K* = gnK,  where  g, as above, is the rate  of capacity  utilization;  n is an index 
of the nonobsolescence  of capital,  with  0 s  n s  1, measured  in units  that  reflect  the relative 
obsolescence  of the utilized  capital  stock;  and, as before,  K is the measured  real  available 
capital  stock. 
We then propose  that  n be a function  of unanticipated  price  variability  in the relative 
price of external inputs, n =  (1 -  pj-,  with a > 0, where pu is a measure of unanticipated 
price changes  in the relative  price of nature-based  inputs which are complementary  to 
capital  services,  and  uT  is an  adjustment  coefficient.  We  further  propose  that  this  expression 436  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
relative efficiency of utilized capital inputs after the initial oil-price 
shocks hit in 1973  (with  potentially  comparable  effects after  the second 
wave of increases in 1979).  Interpreted  quite literally,  this suggests that 
the positive effects of increases  in the capital-labor  ratio  were dampened 
after 1973.  This supposition  is tested through  a piece-wise regression  in 
which the slope of the coefficient on the utilized capital-labor  ratio is 
allowed to vary after 1973.81 
None of these tests, whose details are reported  in notes, provides 
support  for the hypothesis about variations  in the nonobsolescence of 
the capital stock. While we continue to think that the hypothesis is 
plausible on theoretical grounds, we are unable to find evidence to 
support it.82 
for pm  can be formulated  in either  of two ways. One  is 
t  (  - a  t  U  P  (',/Pxt1) 
where  a is the average  age of the current  stock of fixed  capital;  m is the period  over which 
price expectations  are formed;  and the absolute  value of the difference  between the two 
price  terms  in the expression  embodies  the hypothesis  that  unanticipated  price  changes  in 
either  direction  would  reduce  the nonobsolescence  of the utilized  capital  stock. 
The same variable  can be formulated  without  the expression  for the absolute  value, 
indicating  that  unanticipated  price  increases  will increase  the obsolescence  of the utilized 
capital  stock while  unanticipated  price  decreases  will have the opposite  effect. 
Neither  formulation  was statistically  significant,  and  the latter  version  actually  had  the 
wrong  sign. We also tested a version  of this variable  in which  pf was substituted  for  p, in 
the definition  of p,. This  variable  had  even less statistical  effect. 
81. Use of piece-wise  regression  ensures  that  we test for a change  in the slope of the 
coefficient  on the capital  intensity  variable  and  not simply  for a change  in the intercept  of 
the equation,  as we did with the dummy  variables  in table 3, and that we constrain  the 
coefficients  on the effects of capital  intensity  to be equal  at t =  1973  and  to allow them  to 
differ  thereafter. 
Adding this variable to both models results in a coefficient with the wrong sign; 
whatever  the meaning,  it is difficult  to sustain  the empirical  conclusion  that  unanticipated 
external  variability  in input  prices, other  things  being  equal, either  dampened  the contri- 
bution  of rising  capital  intensity  or slowed  the rate  of productivity  growth. 
82. We note here  that  we tested one other  hypothesis  concerning  price  effects and  the 
productivity  slowdown. Michael  R. Darby has proposed  that the Nixon round  of price 
controls  artifically  (and  temporarily)  dampened  prices  and  therefore  artifically  overstated 
the value  of real  output  (with  respect  to trend),  thereby  generating  artifically  high  estimates 
of productivity  growth  in 1972  and 1973.  He tests this hypothesis  with a vector of dummy 
variables  linearly  increasing  from 1971:2  to 1973:1  and then linearly  decreasing  back to 
zero in 1974:4.  We cannot perfectly  reproduce  his tests because we are constrained  to 
work with annual  data. But we sought  an approximation  by defining  a dummy  variable T. Weisskopf, S. Bowles,  and D.  Gordon  437 
FINAL  ESTIMATION 
These sequential  tests provide  only one additional  variable  for inclu- 
sion in a final round of estimations. Based on earlier results, and 
particularly  on the effects of adding variables to the social model, it 
would  appear  that  only the measure  of educational  attainment  described 
above deserves further  consideration.  This suggests  that  we might  treat 
the results reported in column 7-2  as the most complete possible 
operational  version  of the general  social model. 
The particular  form of this final specification  seems to us relatively 
less important  than the full effect of all the additional  tests reported  in 
this section. We have tested as many  additional  hypotheses  as we could 
identify  in the literature.  The results seem consistent. Many variables, 
when  included  in the simple  technical  model  first  reported  in 3-2, appear 
to be significant.  When added  to the more inclusive social model, only 
one effect-that  of educational  attainment-holds up. At the same  time, 
the basic results of the social model itself remain  robust  and consistent 
throughout. 
This strengthens  the premise  with which we began:  the recent litera- 
ture has not only been unable to explain much of the productivity 
slowdown  but  has also been misled  by the underspecification  of the basic 
technical model on which it has built its analyses. The social model 
developed here can both provide what appear  to be the missing clues 
in the mystery  of declining  productivity  growth  and correct  some of the 
misperceptions  and biases that have resulted  from this underspecifica- 
tion. 
In particular,  there appear  to be four important  instances of under- 
specification  bias in the estimations  reported  in these various  compara- 
tive exercises: they involve v, the variable  measuring  changes in edu- 
cational  attainment;  If,  the proxy for changes in the sex composition  of 
that  assumes  the values  of 0.5 in 1972,  1.0  in 1973,  and  0.5 in 1974.  One  would, according 
to Darby's  hypothesis,  expect a positive  sign  for this proxy. 
When  this  variable  is added  to the  technical  model,  the  variable  is statistically  significant 
but has the wrong  sign. When  it is added  to the social model,  it has the correct  sign  but is 
statistically  insignificant,  with a t-statistic of only 0.77. We cannot fully explain the 
inconsistency  with  Darby's  results,  given  our  annual  data,  but we suspect  that  his results 
suffer  from  bias as a result  of exclusion of our social variables.  See Michael  R. Darby, 
"The U.S. Productivity  Slowdown:  A Case of Statistical  Myopia,"  Working  Paper  1018 
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the labor force; the coefficients on g, the rate of change of capacity 
utilization;  and k11,  the rate of change  of the utilized  capital-labor  ratio. 
The first two examples of underspecification  bias reinforce  prevalent 
conceptions  about  the productivity  effects of changes  in the composition 
of the labor  force, and  thus strengthen  tendencies  to blame  the unskilled 
and women for the underlying  sources of stagnation.  The second two 
examples  reflect  the anti-Keynesian  strands  of thought  in recent  discus- 
sions of macroeconomics:  if the coefficients  on g and A?g  are relatively 
low (as in 3-2) and the coefficients  on ku  are relatively  high (also true in 
3-2), these findings  reinforce  the beliefs of current  policymakers,  who 
tend  to rely heavily on efforts  to increase  the rate  of investment  directly 
through  profit  subsidies  rather  than  through  efforts  to expand  the growth 
of effective demand.  In either case, judging  by the results of our social 
model, the potential  harvest  of policies grounded  in this technical  model 
will be dramatically  overestimated. 
Policy Implications 
We have identified  some social factors  affecting  aggregate  productiv- 
ity that help illuminate  the decline in productivity  growth  in the United 
States. In particular,  we have concentrated  on the effects of declining 
work  intensity  and  lagging  business  innovation.  Attention  to these social 
determinants  appears to provide some crucial missing clues to the 
productivity  puzzle. 
Does this offer any guidelines  for policies to help revive productivity 
growth?  We limit  ourselves to two general  observations. 
The first is that it is possible to address  problems  of work intensity 
and  business innovation  through  direct  policy intervention.  The second 
is that  the analysis  presented  in  this  paper  does not  and  cannot  distinguish 
among  the variety  of possible policy approaches  to these social sources 
of the  productivity  slowdown.  Although  this  analysis  helps  to underscore 
the importance of the problems, it is incapable of ranking various 
alternatives  on the basis of either  efficacy  or political  desirability. 
Consider  a few leading  alternatives:  conservatives  propose  to restore 
work  intensity  through  intensified  labor  market  discipline  (and,  we might 
add, assaults  on unions)  and  to revive  business  innovation  by unleashing 
private  enterprise  from  the collar  of government  regulation.  Neo-liberals T. Weisskopf,  S. Bowles, and D. Gordon  439 
propose  to restore  work  intensity  through  a new tripartite  social  contract 
among  business, labor,  and  the government  and suggest  planning  instru- 
ments  like those of the Japanese  to foster longer-term  business  planning 
and  innovation.  Progressives  and  leftists propose  to raise  work  intensity 
by increasing  worker  motivation  through  more  participatory  and demo- 
cratic organization  of the workplace and by rapid  wage growth; they 
suggest a combination  of full-employment  programs,  democratic  plan- 
ning, and rising  minimum  wages to spur  greater  business innovation.  If 
necessary  they recommend  supplementing  these instruments  with  public 
innovation  and  investment.83 
Choices among these alternative  approaches  involve clear conflicts 
in basic policy directions and therefore involve fundamental  political 
questions  about  economic priorities.  Although  this analysis  of the social 
determinants  of the productivity  slowdown helps dramatize  the impor- 
tance  of this kind  of political  economic  debate,  it is incapable  of resolving 
it. One  must  return  to more  basic  considerations  of political  and  economic 
possibility and desirability to move from analysis to policy. If the 
productivity  slowdown  is no longer  so puzzling,  policies to address  that 
slowdown can at last be debated with the clarity and coherence they 
deserve. 
APPENDIX 
Variables and Data Sources 
LISTED  BELOW  are the variables entering our empirical analysis and, 
where relevant, the methods used to compile the time series. Except 
where otherwise  noted, the data apply to the nonfarm  private  business 
sector of the U.S. economy. The source notes do not provide  sufficient 
detail  on every  data  adjustment  or  calculation  based  on the cited sources; 
interested  readers  should  contact the authors  for further  clarification.84 
C  =  Business-failure rate, from Economic Report of the President, 
January 1981, table B-91. 
83. We discuss  the differences  among  these policy approaches  in detail  in parts  2 and 
3 of Bowles, Gordon,  and  Weisskopf,  Beyond  the Waste  Land. 
84. The  only  variables  not  listed  here  are  E, D, and  R, which  are  derived  from  variables 
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G  =  Ratio of actual  to potential  output, based on series provided 
by Bureau of Economic Analysis, as updated in Survey of 
Current Business,  vol. 62 (April 1982), p. 25. 
J  =  Cost of job loss, calculated  as reported  in the text, supplied 
by Juliet B. Schor and Samuel Bowles. Sources reported  in 
their  paper, "Conflict  in the Employment  Relation  and Cost 
of Job Loss," Working  Paper  6 (Economics Institute of the 
Center  for Democratic  Alternatives,  1983). 
K  Real capital  stock, defined  as the weighted  sum of the net (1/4) 
and gross (3/4)  values; mid-year  estimates were obtained by 
averaging  previous and current end-year values, based on 
U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of Economic  Analy- 
sis, FixedReproducible  Tangible Wealth in the United States, 
1925-79 (Government  Printing  Office,  March  1982). 
Ka  =  Age of capital stock, based on series for gross stocks of 
equipment in industry, from U.S.  Bureau of the Census, 
Historical  Statistics  of the United States (GPO, 1976), Series 
F-517, and Bureau of the Census,  Statistical  Abstract of the 
United States. 
L  =  Basic BLS index of hours of all persons, as reported in 
Economic Report of the President, January 1981, table B-38. 
Lf =  Percentage  of labor  force  that  is female,  from  U. S. Department 
of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the President, 
1981  (GPO, 1981),  table  A-2. 
Lm =  Percentage  of nonagricultural  employment  in manufacturing, 
from Employment and Training  Report of the President,  1981, 
table C-  1. 
Ln  =  Percentage of nonagricultural  employment in trade and in 
finance, insurance, and real estate, from Employment  and 
Training Report of the President,  1981, table C-1. 
L=  Percentage  of the  labor  force  between  ages sixteen  and  twenty- 
four, from Employment and Training  Report of the President, 
1981,  table  A-5. 
Pf  =  Calculated  by the same procedure  as that  for determining  Px, 
with BLS index  for fuels in the numerator. 
Px =  Calculated by dividing the BLS quarterly  price index for 
nonagricultural  crude  materials  by the corresponding  implicit 
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the national  income  and  product  accounts, updated  in Survey 
of Current Business,  vol. 62 (July 1982). 
Q  =  Index of production-worker  hourly  output,  (Y!L)  (1 + S). 
S  =  Ratio of nonproduction  workers to production  workers in 
private  nonagricultural  establishments,  based  on U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Employment andEarnings,  United States, 
1909-78  (GPO, 1979), updated in Employment and Earnings, 
June 1982,  pp. 2-3. 
U  =  Percent  of nonagricultural  labor  force that  is unionized,  based 
on Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Directory of National  Unions 
and Employee Associations,  1979, Bulletin 2079 (GPO, Sep- 
tember  1980),  incorporating  revisions  reported  in BLS, "Cor- 
rected Data on Labor Organization  Membership-1980," 
USDL Release 81-446,  September  18, 1981. 
V  =  Median  years of educational  attainment  of the civilian labor 
force,  from Historical  Statistics  of the  United States,  table 
13, with linear  interpolations  for earlier  years. 
W! =  Based on new series reported  in Thomas E. Weisskopf, "A 
New Spendable  Earnings  Series," Technical  Note 2 (Econom- 
ics Institute  of the Center  for Democratic  Alternatives,  1983). 
X  =  Energy consumed  by industry,  measured  in Btu units, based 
on Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). 
Y =  Basic Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  index of output,  as reported 
in  Economic  Report  of  the  President,  January  1981,  ta- 
ble B-38. 
Ytr  =  Based on index of industrial  output, from  Economic  Report 
of the President, January 1981, table B-40. 
Z  =  Based  on splicing  of BLS data  for  manufacturing  on frequency 
of work-time  lost from industrial  accidents, periods before 
and  after  1970.  For  method  and  sources, see Michele  I. Naples 
and David M. Gordon, "The Industrial  Accident Rate: Cre- 
ating  a Consistent  Time  Series,  " Technical  Note 1  (Economics 
Institute  of the Center  for Democratic  Alternatives,  1981). Comments 
and Discussion 
Martin Neil Baily: Many of us have been struggling  over the past few 
years to understand  the slowdown in productivity  growth. We have 
looked for evidence of declines  in the rate  of technical  change, in capital 
services, or in work effort. Various  attempts  have been made  to control 
for  the impact  of the business  cycle. Despite  our  best efforts,  there  exists 
no consensus among economists on the relative importance  of these 
alternative  explanations  of the slowdown. 
This original  and provocative  paper  argues  that the slowdown is due 
to the combined  effects of the business  cycle, a reduction  in work  effort, 
and a diminution  in the rate of innovation.  It develops new variables  to 
proxy for these latter  two factors and tests the results econometrically. 
I found it an impressive  and valuable  paper. I had many  problems  with 
the results, so that I am skeptical  that the authors  have an explanation 
of the slowdown in which I can have confidence.  But I certainly  do not 
dismiss  their  findings. 
There  were two features  of the paper  that  I particularly  liked. First, it 
did attempt  to provide  a serious rationale  for each of the variables  used 
to explain the slowdown. Second, the econometric results were very 
good and were surprisingly  robust  to the inclusion  of other  variables  or 
to variations  in the time period. 
Turning  to the criticisms, I begin with general  comment  on method- 
ology. The  paper  uses an  unconstrained,  multivariable  regression.  Apart 
from  cyclical movements,  however, there  are only three distinct  trends 
to be observed in postwar  U.S. productivity  data. These consist of the 
growth  rates  over the three  periods  distinguished  by the authors.  It is all 
too easy to find  half  a dozen variables  to "explain"  these three  observed 
rates of growth in a regression. Several studies in the literature  have 
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done well econometrically using very different sets of explanatory 
variables.  The authors  describe  growth  accounting  as tautological.  That 
is not  true.  Its problem  is the reverse,  that  it relies  on strong  assumptions. 
But those assumptions  do provide a discipline by constraining  coeffi- 
cients. Regression  analysis  simply  selects the values that  fit best. 
In  addition  to my general  suspicion  of their  method,  I had  two specific 
problems with the authors' model. The first problem concerns the 
capacity  utilization  variable.  Capacity  utilization  is defined  as GNP over 
potential  GNP. But movements  in GNP are very highly  correlated  with 
movements  in nonfarm  business  GNP, the numerator  of their  productiv- 
ity measure.  This means that when capacity  utilization  is multiplied  by 
the  capital-labor  ratio,  the result  is almost  equal  to the dependent  variable 
times the ratio of the capital stock to potential output. This makes 
spurious correlation  very likely and probably  explains why k, has a 
coefficient  well above the income share of capital. Since both the level 
and rate of  change of  capacity utilization also enter the equation 
separately,  the possibilities  for spurious  correlation  are multiplied.  The 
sum  of the coefficients  on g, Aig,  and  k1,  is equal  to 0.96 in column 1-1  of 
their  table 1. That  is suspiciously  close to unity and raises concern that 
there  is almost  an  identity  implicit  in the equation.  At face value  it implies 
that an increase in capacity utilization, other things being equal, is 
reflected  almost one-for-one  in productivity.  A cyclical adjustment  of 
this  magnitude  is two or  three  times  the short-run  effect that  I have found 
using  unemployment  as a measure  of the cycle. 
Not only does the authors'  specification  exaggerate  the impact  effect 
of slack  capacity  on productivity,  but also it does not allow the produc- 
tivity loss to be regained  in a persistent recession. If short-run  labor 
hoarding  is a cause of the decline in productivity  in a downturn,  then 
one would  expect much  of the excess labor  to be shed during  a period  of 
persistent slack. Jeffrey Sachs found that persistent slack actually 
increases  productivity,  which could be true  if the remaining  production 
is concentrated  on high productivity  capital and labor.' This issue is 
important  when the authors  account for the slowdown in table 4. The 
lower average  rate of capacity  utilization  in the 1970s  compared  to the 
1960s probably accounts for less  of the slowdown than their table 
indicates. 
1. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Real Wages and Unemployment  in the OECD Countries," 
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I want to discuss now the general  issues raised by the paper. Have 
there been declines in work  effort  and in the rate of innovation  that can 
be reasonably  proxied  by such variables  as the industrial  accident rate, 
the cost of job loss, and the business failure  rate?  My basic reaction  is 
that these proxy variables  are rather  distant  from the underlying  con- 
cepts. Consider  first  the business  failure  rate  as a proxy  for innovation. 
The paper  is a little unclear  about the interpretation  of the business 
failure  variable. Bankruptcy  is described  as a threat to business. This 
presumably  would  mean  that  managers  innovate  when  bankruptcy  seems 
likely. With  this  interpretation,  bankruptcy  can  be taken  as an  exogenous 
determinant  of productivity  growth.  But then the variable  should  not be 
cyclically corrected. Recessions should stimulate  innovation. The au- 
thors' preferred interpretation  is  based on  Schumpeter's idea that 
innovation  causes bankruptcy.  There are two problems  with this view. 
The first is that it suggests that the failure rate is not exogenous. 
Productivity  growth  causes bankruptcy  rather  than  vice versa. Second, 
I suspect that  most bankruptcies  are  not a result  of changing  technology. 
Osborne Computer  certainly  went under because of innovation  by its 
competitors, but the majority  of failures take place among small con- 
struction  companies  and retailing  concerns  that start  up and  fold all the 
time, and  these failures  are  not related  to innovation.  (In 1978,  62 percent 
of all  bankruptcies  were  in  these two industries.)  I am  currently  research- 
ing the question of whether innovation  has slowed. It may well have 
done so, but we need a better  proxy than  the business  failure  rate. 
I was also concerned about the way in which the failure rate was 
manipulated  before  being  put into the regression.  The raw  data, given in 
various issues of the Survey of Current Business,  show by far the lowest 
failure  rates occurring  from 1943  through  1948.  The rate then rises to a 
peak  in 1961.  This is well before  the slowdown  began.  Their  transformed 
variable  is shown in figure  2 of the paper. It peaks in 1967  and has its 
lowest values in the late 1970s. 
The authors  allege  that  only Marxian  economists  allow  for variations 
in work effort. That  is not true. People have been blaming  productivity 
problems  on a lack of work effort at least since biblical  times. Arthur 
Burns  blamed  the current  slowdown  on work effort  in a speech in 1977, 
and David Stern has developed this idea in detail.2  The authors cite 
2. Arthur  M. Burns, "The Significance  of Our Productivity  Lag," commencement 
address  at the University  of South Carolina,  May 16, 1977;  and David Stern, Managing 
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evidence of a breakdown  in labor-management  peace that began in the 
late 1960s.  A rise in the industrial  accident  rate  at the time also increased 
alienation, they argue. Many of the anecdotes and also the data on 
accidents apply  to the highly  unionized  manufacturing  sector. But that 
is a problem  because  productivity  growth  in manufacturing  did not slow 
down at all until  after 1973.  The timing  does not look right. 
The cost-of-job-loss variable is, in principle, an appealing  way to 
capture  variations  in the effective pressure on workers. In practice, I 
was uneasy about  the way it turned  out. This series is shown in figure  1 
of the paper and displays a very marked  cycle that may be driving  its 
statistical significance. This suspicion is fueled by the fact that this 
variable,  unlike  the authors'  other  social variables,  holds its significance 
in 1948-66. When  one abstracts  from  the cycle, the trends  do not do well 
in explaining  the slowdown. The variable  reaches a maximum  in 1961, 
then falls until 1969  before rising  again. The average  value from 1973- 
79, when the slowdown was most severe, is about the same as the 
average  value from 1948-54, a period  of rapid  productivity  growth. 
I wonder  how a similar  variable  would  do in other  countries.  Certainly 
transfer  programs  have grown  in Europe  as well as in the United States. 
But the European  slowdown  has coincided  with a serious deterioration 
in  unemployment.  In 1982  the simple  average  of the unemployment  rates 
in Germany  and France  was 7.4 percent, two or three times its level in 
the 1960s.  And an average  of 56 percent  of the unemployed  had  been out 
of work for more than six months (compared  with 17 percent in the 
United States).3  Suppose these countries  had had a productivity  speed- 
up. The Marxists  would  probably  be complaining  about  the barbarity  of 
a system  in  which  the  reserve  army  of the  unemployed  allowed  capitalists 
to pressure  workers  in this way. 
Because there has been a slowdown, there is a natural  tendency to 
select all the evidence pointing  toward  a decline in work effort. But not 
all the evidence points the same way. For example, Janice Hedges, 
writing  in the Monthly  Labor  Review, concludes that  job commitment 
has not declined.4  Moreover,  my own work  on the slowdown  by industry 
has  found  that,  within  manufacturing,  it is the capital-intensive  industries 
3. Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and Development, OECD Economic 
Outlook  (Paris:  July 1983),  pp. 45-46. 
4. Janice N.  Hedges, "Job Commitment  in America: Is It Waxing or Waning?" 
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that have had the biggest slowdowns.5  This result is consistent with a 
decline occurring  in capital services. It is inconsistent  with the Weiss- 
kopf-Bowles-Gordon  view that  labor  services have declined. 
The authors  test a few alternative  hypotheses about the slowdown 
using their equation. Given the problems  with their specification,  I am 
unsure  of the validity  of any of these tests. But I will comment  briefly  on 
the tests of the Baily hypothesis. In one test they use price  variability  as 
a proxy for capital obsolescence. That is not unreasonable, but the 
particular  variable  they use impressed  me as a fairly  weak one, so I was 
not surprised  at its poor statistical  performance.  The variable  they use 
to test the Bruno  hypothesis  is also quite consistent with my approach, 
and  that  test does somewhat  better. 
Their  second  test was not valid.  To test for  a decline  in  capital  services 
some  variable  has  to be included  in  the  regression  that  carries  information 
about  this decline-such  as the price  variable  used in the first  test or the 
market value of capital. Their second test does not include such a 
variable.  A simple  production  function  framework  shows that their  test 
could come out either way depending, arbitrarily,  on the correlation 
between  the decline  in capital  services and  the growth  rate  of the capital- 
labor  ratio. 
The authors  have written  their  paper  forcefully, suggesting  that they 
can solve the mystery of the slowdown. I have responded  in kind with 
some strong  criticisms  of their specification  and variables.  But I do not 
want to tip the scales too far the other way. The slowdown is such an 
interesting  and difficult  puzzle because the evidence is so hard  to come 
by and different  pieces of it often point in different  directions.  Declines 
in the rate  of innovation  and  in work  effort  may well be part  of the story 
of the slowdown. And the authors  have made  an interesting  and  original 
attempt  to test these hypotheses. 
Albert  Rees: This is an interesting  and highly  original  paper,  but not an 
easy one on which to comment. The model presented is complex and 
includes  many  unfamiliar  variables. 
The authors' basic thesis is that most of the decline in productivity 
growth  since the mid-  1960s  can be explained  by two factors, a decline  in 
5.  Martin  Neil Baily, "The Productivity  Growth Slowdown  by Industry,"  BPEA, 
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work intensity and a decline in the propensity  of business to innovate. 
This leaves little ground  for rounding  up many of the usual suspects, 
such as a decline in investment  in plant and equipment  or increases in 
government  regulation. 
I shall  confine  my remarks  to the part  of the model  that  deals with the 
decline in work intensity. Let me first say that I see nothing  inherently 
implausible  about  this hypothesis;  indeed  it is supported  by a great  deal 
of anecdotal  evidence and some scattered  statistical  evidence on such 
matters  as rates of absenteeism. I do have serious difficulties  with the 
way in which the hypothesis  is modeled. 
One of the variables  used to represent  the decline  in work  intensity  is 
the change in real spendable  earnings,  on the theory that workers  have 
less motivation  to work hard when their real earnings  are not rising. 
Weekly after-tax  earnings also are part of the highly significant  inde- 
pendent  variable,  "cost-of-job  loss" (entering  twice), though  they enter 
the variable  in a complicated  fashion. 
Conventional  theory also assumes a relation  between real earnings 
and  productivity,  but  with  the  causality  pointing  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Instead of assuming  that a decline in real earnings  causes a decline in 
productivity,  conventional  economists  assume  that  a decline  in produc- 
tivity causes a decline in real earnings.  It is well known  that  time-series 
regressions  with no lagged  variables  are poor tools for determining  the 
direction  of causality. Observing  a high  correlation  between  the number 
of stork  nests in Sweden  and  the Swedish  birth  rate  does not  discriminate 
between the theory that storks bring  babies and the theory that babies 
bring  storks  and, of course, does not prove the correctness  of either. 
The authors' preferred  method of cutting the causality knot is to 
replace the change in real spendable earnings with the second time 
derivative  of real  spendable  earnings.  This  has  been  done  in  the equations 
shown in their table 1. The rationale  for including  real earnings  as an 
explanation  for work  intensity  seems to me to be weakened  by this shift 
to the second derivative,  and I do not know what to make  of the results. 
My strong  prior  belief, which is that  causality  flows  from  productivity  to 
real  wages, is unshaken,  but  this may  testify only to the stubbornness  of 
my adherence  to conventional  economics. 
Let me turn next to another  of the variables  used to represent  the 
decline  in  work  intensity.  This  is the variable  "intensity  of supervision," 
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ees. This variable turns out to be simply the ratio of nonproduction- 
worker  hours  to production-worker  hours  in  the  nonfarm  private  business 
sector. The authors  contend that essentially all nonproduction  workers 
are engaged in the surveillance  or supervision  of production  workers. 
This contention is outrageous,  particularly  as it applies to mining  and 
manufacturing.  It is correct  for  foremen,  plant  managers,  and  personnel 
department staff. But all the people engaged in sales,  advertising, 
distribution,  accounting,  finance,  and  research  are  nonproduction  work- 
ers. Typists and  billing  clerks employed  in central  headquarters  or sales 
branches  hundreds  of miles from mines or factories are considered in 
this model to be engaged in the surveillance  of production  workers. 
Surely Karl Marx, who was an acute observer of the industrial  scene, 
would have been amused  by the notion. 
The ratio  of production-  to nonproduction-worker  hours  is one of the 
few  variables in the model whose behavior is  easy  to  understand 
intuitively.  It must  be highly  cyclical and  hence highly  collinear  with  the 
explicit  cyclical variable  in the model,  capacity  utilization.  It is therefore 
no surprise  that  it is insignificant  when entered  separately. 
The authors also use the accident rate as a variable to proxy for 
changes  in working  conditions.  This  variable  turns  out to be surprisingly 
powerful,  and I can see no serious  problems  with their  interpretation  of 
it. 
Since many of my remarks  have been critical, let me conclude by 
saying  again  that  I find  the basic hypothesis  of a decline  in work  intensity 
a plausible one.  I wish, however, that it had been modeled more 
convincingly. 
General  Discussion 
There was broad interest among the participants  in the attempt to 
integrate social factors in analyzing productivity. At the same time, 
many  were unconvinced  that  the variables  used by the authors  could be 
given the interpretation  assigned  to them  in the paper. 
Robert  J. Gordon  observed that, because unemployment  duration  is 
a complicated  lagged  function  of the business cycle, its cyclical corre- 
lation with productivity  might not be purged  by the authors' use of a 
dependent  variable  corrected only for capacity utilization.  This could 
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which is constructed from unemployment  duration.  Jeffrey Sachs re- 
called his finding (BPEA  1:1983) of a positive correlation between 
unemployment  duration  and productivity,  presumably  arising  because 
inefficient  firms  go out of business during  prolonged  recessions. Chris- 
topher Sims noted that a positive correlation  between unemployment 
duration  and  productivity  could  reflect  the behavior  of firms  adjusting  to 
changes in the labor market  and in their demand  for labor rather  than 
reflecting  workplace  discipline.  The influx  of newly unemployed  at the 
beginning  of a recession lowers average  duration  at the same time that 
productivity  is reduced  because  firms  do not adjust  employment  fully to 
the reduced level of production.  As the recession deepens, firms start 
dishoarding  labor,  thus  boosting  measured  productivity  at the same  time 
unemployment  duration  rises. Sims suggested  breaking  up the compo- 
nents ofj to determine  what  each contributed  separately  in a regression. 
Sims reiterated  Martin  Baily's concern  that  the capital  intensity  variable 
was close to an identity  with the dependent  variable.  And he observed 
that the authors'  use of a "decyclicized" productivity  measure as the 
dependent variable did not eliminate  the difficulty  but only made the 
equation harder  to interpret.  Robert Gordon added that the problem 
could not be dealt with in any simple way because it was a problem  of 
simultaneity  over decades-those  with slower and faster productivity 
trends-not  over years. 
Charles  Schultze  reasoned  that  some  of these variables  are  not proxies 
for the social factors  but more  parallel  to productivity,  either  coinciden- 
tally or because of a common  causal  factor. The exogenous shifts in the 
ratio  of nonproduction  workers  to production  workers  just happened  to 
coincide with productivity shifts in the period being studied. The 
slowdown  in real  wage  growth  and  the productivity  slowdown  after 1973 
could both be due to the oil-price  shock. 
Sachs urged  the authors  to test their  thesis by extending  their  work  to 
other  countries. He noted that  the productivity  slowdown  is a universal 
phenomenon and that in most industrial  countries this slowdown is 
abrupt  and significant  only after 1973.  This points to the oil shock and 
the consequent sluggish output growth as the main candidates  for an 
explanation  of the productivity  slowdown. He also argued  that output 
levels and  productivity  could be related  in more  complicated  ways than 
those implied  by the simple cyclical adjustment  used by the authors  so 
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James  Tobin  suggested  that  the laws and  institutional  arrangements  that 
determine  the likelihood  that a worker  would lose his  job differ  among 
countries  and have changed  through  time; thus the importance  of this 
phenomenon  for productivity  could be examined  more  directly. Samuel 
Bowles replied  that, precisely  because the structure  of labor  relations  is 
so different across countries and historical periods, the response of 
workers  would  be different.  Thus  he did  not believe the present  rules  for 
the postwar U.S.  economy could be easily extended either across 
countries  or between historical  periods. 
Richard Cooper reasoned that, if the decline in work effort is a 
pervasive  phenomenon,  it should  be discernible  in individual  industries 
or occupations  in which  production  techniques  have not changed  much. 
If declining  work effort could not be found in such situations  in which 
its  effects  would be  easily observed, it would cast  doubt on the 
hypothesis that declining  work effort was responsible  for slow produc- 
tivity growth  in the aggregate. 